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COUNCIL OF LOGAN CITY,
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ZOLLINGER, CITY AUDITOR
AND BUDGET DIRECTOR DUANE
A. BECK,
Defendants and
Appellants
---0000000---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
---0000000---

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action wherein Respondents, individual members of the

Logan Municipal Council, the

Logan Municipal Council as a body, and the City of Logan sought
declaratory relief against Mayor Desmond L. Anderson with regard
to the respective powers of the Council and Mayor under the
council-mayor optional form of municipal government.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On Respondents initial Motion for Summary Judgment,
the trial court awarded judgment to Respondent on its first,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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second, and third claims for relief and while makin~ certain
legal conclusions with l':?;ard to the fo;_irtn,

flfth, ei;nt:i,

and ninth claims for relief reserved certain selected issues
for an e·,-identiary hearing, T.R.
trial court

:c;~·2;;'.:3j

at 2J5; see 1'.R. at 343.

,',pr;=:_::.ant'.:; ;,cc;io;1 tc

Blaine Zollinger and

Bud~et

J:'..::.-.~=s

1::ity

Officer Duane Beck as Defendant 3 ,

holding that said parties would be bound by any decision, a 3
subordinates of the Mayor.
At the evidentiary hearing, Appellant and

~~esponde:-1 ::

stipulated to certain rulings including dismissal of the
claim for relief.

scv~~-

Pursuant to the evidentiary hearing and as:

result of memorandums briefing certain legal issues, the trial
court entered its final declaratory judgment generally

granti~

judgment to Respondent on all claims for relief, except the
seventh which had been dismissed by stipulation.

T.R. at 459,

The trial court found generally that the Municioal
Council possessed the governing powers of the municipality
except for those powers expressly vested in the Mayor by th2
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act.

The trial court

specifically found that the Mayor could not buy, sell, or
exchange municipal real property or make interfund transfers
without specific authorization from the Municipal Council.
Further, that subdivisions, including interblock developments,
cluster developments, and planned unit developments, required
Municipal Council approval.

In addition, the Court held tha~

the Council could retain counsel in regards to the instant
declaratory action and with respec-;; to a 1uestio·1~u rc:al
transaction.

·':'J

In connection with that ruling the ~rial court
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-3delineated the characteristics of resolutions as opposed to
ordinances, holding that only the latter could be vetoed by
the Mayor.

Ordinances were found to be acts of a general and

permanent nature, as opposed to resolutions which dealt with
administrative determinations.

The court also found that the

council had a right of access to all municipal records and could
obtain copies free of charge.

The trial court also found that

the city administration could not enter into conditional sales
contracts, they being debt, without Council approval and finally
that budgetary line items could not be added without Council
approval.

In sum, that the Municipal Council is the municipal

governing body except as to those certain specific powers which
are expressly given the Mayor.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Evidently, Appellant concedes large portions of the
Declaratory Judgment and has determined not to appeal therefrom.

Appellant summarizes the partial relief requested from

this Court as being the determination that "all executive
power" is vested in the Mayor and that "all legislative power"
is vested in the Municipal Council.

Respondent seeks from

this Court a reaffirmation of the trial court's ruling that
allocations of municipal powers are as set forth in the
Statutes of the State of Utah as modified and amended by the
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act.

Further, that the

Mayor's powers and duties are as set forth and enumerated
specifically in the statute and that the powers not given to
the Mayor are retained by the body referred to in the original
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,,

--i-

legislation as the "governing body" that bei:ig the i·:unicipal
Council.
STATE~E~T

OF FACTS

In 1975, the Utah State

Legislat~re

Optional Forms of Municipal 3overnment Act.

adopted the
Logan was the Nn:

Utah municipality to initiate the optional council-mayor form
in a referendum held in late 1975.

When Logan citizens took

their ballots they read a summary description of this new
council form on their ballot title:
BALLOT TITLE
Shall the Council-Mayor form of Municipal
Government be adopted by Logan City? Said
form of governrr.ent provides for the election
of five (5) councilmen at large and one (1)
mayor.
The Council would be the governing body of
Logan City and its primary functions under
said form would be to pass ordinances,
appropriate funds, and review municipal
administration.
The Mayor's primary functions would be to
enforce ordinances, execute policies adopted
by the Council, appoint officers and department heads with the advice and consent of the
Council, and to exercise control of all
departments, etc. within the City.
T.R. at 439 (emphasis added).
narrowly passed.

The council-mayor form 1rns

In 1976, Logan inaugurated the council-mayor

optional form.
Disputes quickly arose as to the respective division
of power within the municipality.

The Mayor, Appellant herein,

argued po1:1er was divided by recurrence to definitions or t11 3
terms
"legislative."
locus
of each power
Sponsored by "executive"
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. and
Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute of The
Museum and
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-5under this view would be determined by whether its nature was
primarily "executive" or "legislative."

Not only did the

Appellant make such assertions but he proceeded to operate
Logan City according to his own interpretation.

This included

the sale, purchase and exchange of municipal property without
notice to, or approval of, the Municipal Council; large scale
interfund transfers of Logan City funds again without notice
to or approval of the Council; unilateral approval of planned
unit developments, cluster housing and interblock developments;
refusals to carry out resolutions of the Council; etc.

Respond-

ents, on the other hand, maintained that the Municipal Council
was the residuary locus of the governing powers except as those
powers had been specifically enumerated as belonging to the
Mayor.
When the disputants were unable to satisfactorily
resolve their differences, respondents initiated the instant
action for declaratory relief seeking not so much a judgment
affirming their position as a final and binding legal interpretation of powers.

Once initiated, the Respondents determined

that it was wise to raise not only the issues immediately
pressing them, but the broader issues existing under this new
form of municipal government.
After the instant litigation was initiated the Utah
State Legislature passed certain laws heralded as a recodification of certain municipal laws.

The Utah League of Cities and

Towns of which Appellant is First Vice President, drafted these
changes.

Encompassed within that legislation were certain

linguistic changes relative to the Optional Forms of Municipal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Government Act.

Catch phrases such as "executive" and

"legislative" were inserted where no such words had been
before along with the following words, ":separate, equal ancJ
independent branches."

Language specifically stating that the

Municipal Council was the "governing body" was dropped.
the changes were caused

Hoviev::

or initiated, the trial court found tna:

against the mosaic of the remaining portions of the original
'

statute, the linguistic changes had, in fact, caused no subst 2:-'
tive change in the thrust or divisions of powers inherent int'.'
original legislation.

I

That determination whether it be

considered a factual or legal conclusion alleviated the

I

labri~L

effort of rendering two separate and conflicting judgments with'
one judgment and broadened the impact and applicability of the
trial court's opinion.

As such, the trial court's decision

provides a continuing guide for proper operation of the

munic~I
I
I

pality.

To assist the Supreme Court in comparin;; the original·,
I

statute and its slightly altered and recodified twin, the relei."'
modifications between the two statutes are set out side by si~

1977 Modifications

1975 Optional Forms Act
10-6-104. Definitions.-As used in this act (a)
"Governing Body" means the
legislative body of any city
or town organized under this
act.

No corresponding section, b~
see §10-3-101, U.C.A.
(Supp. 1977).

10-3-1209.
Council-m~
10-6-112. Council-mayor
and cou~cil-mana~er form
and council manager form
defined.-- The optional for~1 •
defined.--The optional form of
government
known as the
,
government known as the councilmayor vests the f;ov,2rnment 0 ;
mayor form vests the government
municipality v1hich adorts th>
of a municipality which adopts
form in tvw separate, incle!-''.'
this form in a mayor and a
or munic:
Sponsored by the S.J.council.
Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by theand
Institute equal
of Museum andbranches
Library Services
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-71975 Optional Forms Act

1977 Modifications

form known as the council-manager government; the executive
form vests the government of a
branch consisting o~ a mayor
municipality in a council and a
and the administrative departmanager.
me~ts and officers; and the
legislative branch consisting
of a municipal council. The
optional form known as the
council-manager form vests the
government of the municipality
in a municipal council which
shall be deemed the governing
body of the municipality and
a manager appointed by the
council.
10-6-113.
Municipal
Council deemed governing body-Powers and duties.--The
municipal council of a municipality adopting an optional
form of government provided
for in this act shall be
the governing body of that
municipality and shall pass
ordinances, appropriate funds,
review municipal administration, and perform all duties
required of them by law.

10-3-1210.
Functions of
the Council.--The Municipal
Council of a municipality adopting an optional form of government provided for in this part
shall pass ordinances, appropriate
funds, review municipal administration, and perform all duties
that may be required of it by
law.

Hereafter Respondents cite the original Optional Forms of
Municipal Government Act by the following form "original Section
II

"Section

Because of the pervasive use of Utah laws citation as
" is used to refer to Utah Code Annotated 1953

and Supp. 1977.
Response to Appellant's Statement of Facts:
With respect to Appellant's Statement of Facts,
Respondents have several disagreements.

First, the issue of

management of city property was never in dispute and to
R0spondents' knowledge the first time that issue was ever raised

was in Appellant's Brief on appeal to this Court.

The issue on
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u-

real property rela;;ed solely ;;o the
sell, or exchange municipal real property withou;; authority of,
or even notice to, the Municipal Council.

Mayor had

~he

T.R.

441.

Sec 0 ~1.

duty to personally assemble, compile anJ copy

municipal records.

The contention of Respondents was that th 9

Mayor directed his administrative subordinates to supply infor•:.cti on

onl~-

through his office and that he then placed con di tion3

on the Council members'

ri~ht

to obtain that information. On

this issue the trial cour;; found conflicting evidence.

T.R.

at 446.
Response to Burtenshaw/Baird Statement of Facts
This Brief mingles purported facts throughout its
arguments.

Respondent will attemnt to ide•1'.:if:: the sali:mt

facts with which it disagrees, identifying the same by page
numbers in said Brief.
At page 3:

Burtenshaw/Baird s;;ate the "gravel pg

issue" in their opinion is at the heart of the instant action
and confuses the issues before the Court.

Respondents disagre;

and note the trial record is devoid of any such indication.
Such a factual conclusion is unwarranted.
At cage

8:

Burtenshaw/Baird introduce purported

evidence that the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act
is the reincarnation of earlier legislc,tion called the "Stro:-.0 '
Mayor Form."

There is no such evidence in the record and

Respondents dispute the same.

Furthermore, that form of gover

ment was once proposed for Lo~an and the Logan ci tU-:ens by
In any event, ResponJents
vote
same.
Sponsored byrejected
the S.J. Quinney Law the
Library. Funding
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

qu~stio1

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

-9tl1ro basic premise that the interpretation of that Act would

vary from the trial court's interpretation of the council-mayor
form.
At page 10:

Burtenshaw/Baird introduce as though it

were evidence certain vague theories of political science.
Respondents dispute the same and the "obvious" conclusions
arising from such theories.
At page 12 :

Burtenshaw/Baird state "the ,judge's

acceptance of this complaint .

shows his failure to inquire

about and to understand the nature of this dispute."

Whether

that statement is fact, law or emotional outburst, Respondents
dispute the same.
At page 12:

Burtenshaw/Baird state that "Basic to the

theory of the system is that skilled administrators execute a
policy made by the Council with far more equity and efficiency
than an untrained council."

Respondents urge the Court that

this statement is unwarranted and based on some inherent
assumptions about the qualities of individuals who Logan citizens
will choose to elect.

Respondents note Logan citizens in the

past election chose a businessman, untrained in "public administration" as Mayor.

Respondents do agree that the Council makes

policy and the Mayor is to execute that policy.
At pagesl6-19:

Here and throughout their Brief,

Burtenshaw/Baird question the trial judge's procedures,
capacity and intentions.

Respondents dispute the same.
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Resnonse to Let;i3lative Gerne>ral Coun:3el Stat,:rnccnt of Ilacs:
A fact is introduced in the legal argument of this
Brief even though such fact is YJOt in the record, nor has thers
been any evidence supporting the 3arne.

That purported fact 12

that the Utah 2tate Lec:i0lature continued a "trend" begun '-'lit~,
the Strong Mayor

For~

of Government.

P2rhap3 three

consider this to be the case but that can hardlJ

legislate~

repre~en+;

the

view of the entire legislature and such an assumption about

+;r,~

legislative process is clearly unsupported by any evidence e:zc;'.·
the opinion of three legislators.

Respondents could contest

~-I

"trend" only by polling the legislators, cross-examining the

I

I

legislators, etc., all of which would be appropriate at the trL
level, but inappropriate in this Court.
again at Pages

This "fact" surfaces

9 and 10.

Respondents question the appropriatness and the
procedures relative to intr::iducing such a fact into the appella:
record.

More fundamentally, Respondents disagree with that

factual conclusion urging this Court that the legislature's
intent is plain on the face of the Optional Forms of Municipal
Government Act wherein that Act gives the Council policy maki~
authority and describes that body as the governing body.
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE GOVERNING POWERS GIVEH MUNICIPALITIES
10 AND OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS OF THE STATE
ARE VESTED IN THE LOGAN ~UNICIPAL COUNCIL
POWERS SPECIFICALLY GIVEN THE ~AYOR.
[Including Response to Appellant Point I,
Baird Points I-VI and Legisl&~ive Counsel

BY TITLE
OF UTAH
EXCEPT THOSE
BurtenshawPoint I-III.]

Respondents respectfully contend the original Optional
Forms of Municipal Government Act and its recodified successor
are, on their face, clear, specific and unambiguous.

This

clarity is complemented by meshing the Act with existing statutory
and decisional law of the State of Utah and by recurrence to
reputable treatises on municipal law and applicable judicial
decisions in other jurisdictions.
I(A).

Powers given to a municipality are vested in the Municipal
Council unless expressly delegated to the Mayor or
another officer.
The Act itself in original Sections 10-6-104 and

10-6-113 clearly stated that the Municipal Council was the
"governing body," to wit:
The municipal council
. shall be the governing
body of that municipality and shall pass ordinances
appropriate funds, review municipal administration,
and perform all duties that may be required of them
by law.
Original Section 10-6-113.

Apart from the inherent substance

of the words "governing body," those same words are used
throughout the Utah statutes as terms of art which describe the
locus of power within the municipal corporation.

See, Sections

10-10-23 Sponsored
et. by~,;
see also Section 10-8-8.1. The Optional
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Forms of Municipal Government Act meshes into

t~is

existln~

state law by its own Section 10-3-1204 which provides in
relevant part:
All existing statutes governing municipalities
shall ~~main applicable excent as provided in
this act.
Note also the final clause of Section 10-3-1210 which, after
having clearly deemed the municipal council "the governing boci:., I
states that they are to "perform all duties that may be require:
of it by law."

If the intention of that Section wasn't to tie

the new Act back to existing state law setting out the duties

o:

governing bodies, to what law does the Section refer?
The universal rule of legislative construction,

exp~~

unius est exclusio alterius, indicates that when a legislatur"
expressly enumerates powers given, those powers not given or
enumerated are considered to be expressly withheld.

The Utah

Legislature carefully and specifically defined in Section 10-}_
the powers to be held by the Mayor:
In the optional form of government known as
the council-mayor form, the mayor shall be a
registered voter of the municipality from which
is he elected and shall be elected for a term of
four years.
The mayor shall be the chief executi~
and administrative officer of the municipality. He
shall have the power and duty to:
1. Enforce the laws and ordinances of the
municipality;
2. Execute the policies adopted by the council;
3. Appoint and remove administrative assistants,
including a chief administrative officer, and
with the advice and consent of the council,
appoint or remove department heads; and appoint
or remove all other officers, commissions,
boards, and committees of the municipality,
,
except as may otherwise be specifically limite~.
by law.
Where state law provides for the appo1n-·
ment of municipal committees by the governing
body in the council-mayor form of government, t-.
mayo;
shall
appoir.:
the
members
of Services
the committe:;;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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-134. Exercise control of all departments, divisions,
and bureaus within the municipal government;

5. Attend all meetings of

~he council with the
right to take part in all discussions and the
responsibility to inform the council of the
condition and needs of the municipality and
make recommendations and freely give advice to
the council, except that the mayor shall not
have the right to vote in council meetings;

6. Appoint a budget officer for the purpose of
conforming with the requirements of the uniform
municipal fiscal procedures act and in all other
respects fulfill the requirements of that act;

7. Appoint with the advice and consent of the council
a qualified person to each of the offices in
cities of recorder, treasurer, engineer, and
attorney and, in towns, town treasurer and
clerk; create any other offices as may be deemed
necessary for the good government of the municipality, and make appointments to them; and
regulate and prescribe the powers and duties of
all other officers of the municipality, except
as provided by law or by ordinance;

8. Furnish the municipal council with a report,
periodically as determined by ordinance, setting
forth the amounts of all budget appropriations,
the total disbursements to date from these
appropriations, and the amounts of indebtedness
incurred or contracted against each appropriation
(including disbursements and indebtedness
incurred and not paid) and the percentage of
the appropriations encumbered to date, which
reports shall be made available for public
inspections; and

9. Perform such other duties as may be prescribed
by this part or may be required by ordinance not
inconsistent with this part.
Section 10-3-1219 (emphasis added).
with respect to the mayoral veto.

See also Section 10-3-1214
Following the accepted rule

of construction, powers not specifically enumerated therein are
withheld from that officer.

Nowhere in the enumeration of

Section 10-3-1219 is there any indication or even inference that
the Mayor is to possess ultimate and exclusive control over the
property, finances, subdivisions, etc., of a municipality.
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When the oris;inal Opcional For··:s of ':•w 4 ·:ioal Gover~·ment Act was recodified in 197 7, Oric;ina1 Section:' 10-o-1G4
10-6-113, providing that the lllunicipal CouYJcil ·cias the: 3o·J~r:,~:.
body, were replaced with the

follc~in~:

Each municipali t'/ shall havl? a ~·overnin:: body 1mic'~
shall exercise the lc:gislative and executive poi.vers
of the municipality unless the municinality is
organized with separate execu:ive and le~isla~ive
branches of government.
Section 10-3-101 (emphasis added).
The optional form of government kno•:m as the counci:mayor form vests the government of a municipality
which adopts this form in two seoarate, indeoendent
and equal branches of municipal government; the
executive branch consistin~ of a mayor and the
administrative departments and officers; and the
legislative branch consisting of a municioal councE.
Section 10-3-1209 (emphasis added).

The trial court in perusi.:

this change recognized that no substantial modification had
occurred:
The function::; of the council embodied in this sectic
[original Section 10-6-113] are retained in Sectio~
10-3-1201 of Senate Bill 204, but it does eliminate
the phrase that the municipal council is the gov·2rning body.
However, the functions and duties of the
council and the functions and duties of the Mayor
are not substantially changed and remain basically
the same.
Therefore in examining the specific areas of
conflict the Municipal Council will be treated
as the governing body related to those duties of
legislation and other functions provided by law,
and the power and duties of the mayor shall be
determined under his authority as the chief
executive and administrative officer of the
municipality.
As far as indulc;ing in the semantics
involved in the definition of governing power or
powers, the Mayor's duties are restricted to
those enumerated in the legislation.
T.R. at 440.

The trial court recognized that a significant

portion of authority formerly vo2ted in the ConLmission by
previous laws had, by the Optional Forms of ~unicipal Gover~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15Act been transferred to the Mayor.

Tik authority so transferred

was described in Section 10-3-1219 and included enforcement of
laws, execution of policies adopted by the Council, appointments,
control of administrative departments, etc.
The trial court found it unwarranted to presume that a
wholesale grant of power was given to the Mayor by the words
"chief executive and administrative officer of the municipality."
Appellant's argument to the contrary ignores the fact that in
other Utah laws the same terms are used in reference to mayors
of municipalities without any such imnlication.

See Section

10-1-104(2) referring to mayors in all cities as "executives"
and Section 10-3-809 describing the mayor as the "chief executive
officer."

See State v. City of Seattle, 492 P2d 1078, in

which the Washington Supreme Court finds such words are used
loosely without clear legislative intent to force municipal
actions into rigid classifications.

See also J and M Realty

Co. v. City of Norwalk, 239 A2d 534 (Conn. 1968).

The Mayor's

duties and powers under the Act are clearly defined, no loose
and simplistic application of some general sense of what
constitutes executive powers should expand those definitions.
This interpretation of the Optional Forms of
Municipal Government Act is buttressed by reputable treatises
and judicial decisions in other states and Respondents can
find no reputable contradictory authority.
It is still the rule [referring to municipal
governments having mayor-executive and
municipal council-legislative divisions),
however, that all powers granted to a
municipal corporation are vested in the
council unless expressly delegated to some
other officer or body.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Services and
Technology Act, administered
the Utah State Library.
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal
Corporations
§ by 140.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

.'l!ii~2

the e;overni:1,_:~ b0dJ7 of'

,'J

~nu~·iic1_0:_:~-i

::0~·r:·1_,1·etti:i-~

is not t112 corpcraticn it3elf, l1ow~o~v·-~
·
constituted, the council or other governin~
body is the gen ;1"al ;i.o;'::nt of th' c0r~~·watio:1 fol·
all pUr003cS a:td ex~1·ci:;.~s all tne Coroorat>'
!:2.Q'•vers not express!'/ crimmittcJ by law to
otner cJaru:; or 0fficero.

62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporation
(emphasis added).

§

··

153 at 313 (footnotes ornittc,

See also 5385 2t 723-29, e.g. 2A Antieau,

f'.c_;nicipal Corporation La·"

§

22. 0 7 ( h2r2inafter cited as

~,

In City of Princeton v. Woodruff, 104 NE2d 748,
(Ind. 1952), the Supreme Court of Indiana approved the

princ~~

that powers not expressly given by the state legislature to
another entity are reserved to the cor:mon council:
In every municipal corporation . . there is
and necessarily must be an official body or
board constituted and empo111ered to exercise
the sovereign powers of government delegated to,
or vested in the corporation by the state .
[which is] the legislative body or assembly
of the municipality.
104 NE2d at 752.

The Washington Supreme Court in Othello v.

Harder confirmed:
It is the general rule . . . that the powers
delegated to a municipal corporation by the
legislature are vested in tne city or town
council unless expressly delegated to some
other office or body
284 P2d 1099, 1102 (Wash. 1954),

see_,~:_:~··

State v. O'Connell,

523 P2d 872, 889 (Wash. 1974) reaffirming Othello holding.
City of New Britain v.

Hancoc~,

the Connecticut court had

occasion to apply this principle to real property purchases:
In tlL absence of a specific charter provision
gi vine a similar po1ver to otl12r specified
officials of the city, the court construes
the charter to vest in the common counci 1 ti1e
power to purchase the subject land and not to
vest that power in any other elected or
appointed officials.
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In

l

-17373 A2d 859, 862 (Conn. 1976).
Council of City of Watertown

See, e.g., Shaw v. Common
63 NW2d 252 (S.D. 1954); Visone

v. Reilly, 194 A2d 248 (N.J. Super, 1963).

Nor is this a new

rule, but one of long-standing significance.

See Crouch v.

Commonwealth, 189 SW 693, 700-701 (Ky. 1916); Comley v. B'd of
Purchase and Supplies, 149 A. 410, 413 (Conn. 1930); 43 Corpus
Juris, Municipal Corporation

I(B).

§§

238, 240; 28

~-

317.

Mayoral powers described and enumerated by Section 10-3-1219
and elsewhere should be narrowly construed
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted strictly the

powers given municipalities and their officers by Utah municipal
law.

In Stevenson v. Salt Lake City Corp., the Court, held:
That the powers of the city are strictly
limited to those expressly granted, to those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
to the powers expressly granted, and to those
essential to the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation, is settled law in this state.

317 P2d 597, 598 (Ut. 1952) (emphasis added).

See e.g.,

American Fork City v. Robinson 292 P. 249 (Ut); Wasfell v.
Ogden City, 249 P2d 507 (Ut. 1952).

This well worn principle

should be followed along with its corollary:
It is a cardinal principle of municipal law
that a city has only those powers which are
expressly granted to it by the legislature or
constitution, or which are necessarily implied
from such powers as are granted.
A corollary
is that a city official has only such-powers as
are expressly granted to the official by the
legislature, or are necessarily implied from
those powers which are granted.
Watson v. State, 518 P2d 931, 933 (Wyo. 1974).

Municipal

officials are limited to those "powers and duties as are confirmc:d upon
expressly
or forby
necessary
implication."
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Othello v. Harder, 284 P2d 1099, 1102 (tfash.
The treatises are in
officers "have only suc:1 po·H9rs
37 Am Jur

§

260 at 884.

accord,holdin~
'.lei

1')5'.J).
that municipa:

ar0 specificall.Y r;rar1t':':i.

The terms used to designate the m2

•

are not considered to be a substantive grant of power:
The mayor is the official head of a municipal
corporation and, as such, is a nunicioal
officer.
He is til.e chief executive officer
of the municipality .
Also, the term
"mayor or chief executive," is a mere
description of the office and not of the
character or extent of the powers confided
to that office .
The mayor's functions, as prescribed in the
charter or other governing law, differ in
various municipalities, and his powers may
be legislative, executive, or judicial,
according to the particular governing law.
As in the case of municipal officers
generally
the functions and powers
of the mayor of a city are derived from, and
depend entirely on, constitutional, statutory,
or charter provisions and valid ordinances,
resolutions, or bylaws, passed in accordance
therewith; and he takes nothing beyond the
powers expressly conferred or necessarily
imolied.
62 C.J.S.

§

543 and 998-999 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis

added);~'

2A Antieau, Supp. at 127.

Thus as summarized in a hoary old Wisconsin case:
They [referring to municipal officers] and
each of them, may proceed step by step within
their prescribed orbit, and in strict conformity with the law that sets them in
motion.
Ricketson v. City of Milwaukee, 81 NW 864, 866 (Wisc. 1900).
Failing this their acts constitute a usurpation of authority
and result in the application of the ultra vires doctrines.
Appellant here has on the basis of a mere "title" presume l r·
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-19exercise unilaterally the authority of a .. inicipal corporation.
Not even under the most lenient construction of strong mayor
municipal government forms, has any mayor pretended to be so
"strong."

I ( C).

Comparable Mayor-Council, Strong Mayor and Federal
government forms do not authorize the mayoral powers
which the Appellant has presumed to exercise.
A careful reading of Utah's repealed Strong Mayor

Form of Government, Section 10-6-76 et.

~·,

indicates nowhere

a grant to the "strong mayor" of the kind of authority Appellant
here asserts.

For example, Section 10-6-79 vests the "board

of commissioners" with power "to pass ordinances, review
municipal administration and to perform all duties that may be
required of them by law."

This section then clearly removes

the board from exercising any "administrative or governing
authority conferred upon the mayor."

But nowhere in the Act

is the mayor conferred authority to incur indebtedness nor
to transfer monies from one fund to another nor to buy, sell,
and exchange real property.

In similar fashion to the Optional

Forms of Municipal Government Act, these powers continue to
reside in the "corrunission" or "council."
New Jersey has developed at least fifteen optional
forms for municipal government in what must be a record for
one state.

Parenthetically, we note the laws and annotated

cases dealing with this bewildering variety of municipal forms
9overs six volumes of more than 700 pages each.

In that

infinite variety, there is not one form in which the mayor,
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-20manager, chief executive or president wields the power asse"'v:
~

by Appellant herein.

See N.J. Stat. Ann.

40:60-26 giving

po,.

of sale of real property to the "governing body" and which
requires notice and public sale or passage of an ordinance
and private sale, or resolution and delayed final
approval by a named state official.

apr~=~~l

wI

A unilateral sale by a

"chief executive" or other titular head is simply not allowea.

i
I

Hew Mexico has what is termed a Mayor-Council form. I
See New Mex. Stat. Ann.

§§

14-10-1 et.~·

In that form the\

Council manages the property and the Mayor administers
ments, appoints and enforces ordinances.
Ann.

14-10-4, 14-10-6, 14-11-3.

§§

See New Mexico Stat.

Oklahoma has what i t call'

a Statutory Strong-Mayor-Council Government.
Ann.

962.1 et. ~·

§

dep~~

See 11 Okl. St.

Nowhere in that Oklahoma statute is th~

"strong mayor" given authority to deal with real property
although he very specifically is given authority to purchase
supplies, equipment and materials subject to regulation by the
Council.
~

§

11 Okl. St. Ann.

§

962.24.

See, e.g., Wash. Code

35A.12 et seq.
In Ohio, they have an optional form referred to as

the ''Federal Plan" which sets up an executive-legislativejudicial model based on the state and federal model.
Rev. Code Ann.

§§

705.71

et.~·

Ohio

In this form all legislatiV'

power expressly goes to the Council and all executive power
expressly goes to the Mayor.

But even under this clearest

example of what Appellant tells us the Optional Forms of
Municipal Government Act is, there is no authority express or
implied
for the Mayor to exercise the type of authority which
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-21the Appellant claims.
duties of the mayor.

See Section 705.79 setting out specific
Again the Council is the residuary holder

or locus of power by reason of Section 705.86 which ties that
"Federal Plan" to existing allocations of state powers, for
example, to Sections 721.02, 721.03, 721.13, 721.26 requiring
municipal land to be sold only upon the vote of the Council.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
In fact, Respondents are unable to locate any state
which under any statute sets up a municipal government wherein
a mayor or chief executive can do the things Appellant contends.
Furthermore, Respondents doubt such a system exists.

It matters

little what title is used to describe the functional units,
forms or plans, the various state legislatures have not seen
fit as a matter of policy to clothe a single individual with
this type of unilateral authority.
The question before this court is simply whether the
Mayor has power and authofity to do the specific acts complained
of.

Perhaps as an aid to reasoning an inquiry into "executive"

vs. "legislative" nature may be useful, but where is it so
clearly indicated that an executive official
lateral powers?

ha~

these uni-

The model' the Appellant seeks to foist upon

the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act does not exist
even in the separation of powers, executive-legislativejudicial, federalistic system.

Even should the Appellant be

successful in proving to this Court that each and every scrap
of "administrative" and "executive" function is possessed
completely and solely by him, there still must be proof that
the powers he asserts are of that nature.

Respondents doubt,
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that even in the most rigid executive-lezislative del
the Mayor's power and authority even approaches the power
asserted by him in Logan City government.
In conclusion, a careful reading of the Utah
Forms of Municipal Government Act as modified and recodified
1977 reveals the true positions of the Council vis-a-vis the
Mayor.

In describing the Council's functions there is a broa.:

grant of power terminating with the words "and Derforms all
duties that may be required of it by law."
To what law does the statute refer?

Section 10-3-121J.

1

To the general laws of

Utah giving powers to municipalities.

In describing the

!

M~~:

I

there is a specific enumeration of nine closely defined powe"s

,i

I
terminating with the words "and perform such other duties as::
be prescribed by this part or may be required by ordinance mt

I

inconsistent with this part.
does the statute refer?

Section 10-3-1219.

To what

11

pa:·1

"Part" refers solely to the Optional

Forms of Municipal Government Act.

The Mayor has no authorit/

not specifically granted by the Act.

I(D).

Response to Appellant's Brief - Point I
( 1)

REPLY TO:

"Utah's legislature intended the optionsl
council-mayor form of municipal government .
. to be patterned after the
federal and state separate-power models.
[Appellant's Brief at 8.]

Respondents do not disagree that the legislature
intended to separate powers, specifically that general
administrative and executive duties were to be vested in the
Mayor and his subordinate officers.

However, a mere separat~
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-23model of separation be followed. The question better stated
is which entity receives which powers?

There is

noth~~6

inherent in tne premise of separation of powers that says the
federal model is mandatory.

For example, in a business

corporation there is also a separation of powers between the
Board of Directors and the President which separation is not
based on the federal model.

There are good reasons for our

federalistic national system that are not applicable to Logan
City.

Even were Respondents to concede this point, they deny

that under that system Appellant would have the authority and
power he has purported to exercise.
There are numerous indications from the wording of
the Act itself that the Respondent's theory of separation was
not intended by the legislature. For example, Section 10-3-1217
restricts the Municipal Council from meddling with employees of
the City, proscribing the members of the council from individually
seeking
to influence the acts of the chief executive
or any other officer, to direct or request
except in writing, the appointment of any
person to, or his removal fromoffice; or to
interfere in any way with the performance
by such officers of their duties.
The council
and its members shall deal with the administrative affairs of the municipality solely through
the chief executive and shall not give orders
to any subordinate of the mayor or manager
either publicly or privately . .
Section 10-3-1217 (emphasis added).

This Section

is necessary

and appropriate; city employees would be in a difficult position
if they had to respond to six employers, the Mayor and five
Council members.

But Appellant's contention that the Act
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prohibits the Municipal Council from doing anything other than

-24pure legislative tasks is specifically ne~ated by the 3ection.
It states that the council "shall deal ·11ith administrative
affairs solely through the chief executivr; (mayor)."

That

statute is a clear ackno'.vledgment of the ccuncil' s proper role,
it cannot bypass the mayor and deal directly with depart;ied;;
heads or employees but it can deal with administrative afL1 i:o:.
The Section does not prohibit the Municipal Council from
involvement in any "administrative affairs," rather the Sect::.::.
acknowledges such a power and describes the proper manner of
dealing with the specified administrative task--employee
relations.
Appellant's assertion is that all "administrative

o~

executive powers were assigned to the mayor" under Section
10-3-1219.

That assertion is erroneous.

Section 10-3-1219

nowhere gives the mayor unrestricted sway over all things
"executive" or "administr:ttive" in nature.

That Section cleari

and carefully enumerates a series of nine responsibilities or
administrative roles.

Those enumerated duties are hardly an

exhaustive list of administrative functions, for example,
nowhere is it stated that the mayor has authority to buy,
sell, and exchange real property on his own volition.
Another example is the series of statutes which
clearly require administrative or executive action on the part
of the Municipal Council.

See Sections 10-9-1 et. sea.,

clearly requiring the "legislative body" to perform administr"·
tive and executive tasks in regard to zoning and planning.
The recodified municipal lesislation specifically
provides
that all legislative powers shall be exercised thro':c
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ordinances.

Section 10-3-701.

If Appellant's arguments are

correct that the Municipal Council has only "legislative"
powers then it is restricted to exercising all its power
through ordinances.

Yet the original act specifically mentioned

resolutions were to be passed by the Council.
Section l0-6-116.

See original

It is noted specifically that by Section

10-3-713 resolutions deal with "administrative powers."

One

of the specific examples given by the statute of a proper
resolution is to regulate the "use and operation of municipal
property."

Section 10-3-717 (4). ·
In summary, it is clear that the Council is expressly

vested with two distinct and distinguishable "rule making"
powers.

The first type of such "rules" they were to make were

"ordinances."
rules.

The second type of "rules" were "policy making"

Sections 10-3-701 et.

~·

The Mayor is given veto

power over the first (ordinances) coupled with an apparent
duty to enforce them.

Sections 10-3-1214, 10-3-1219(1).

As to the second type or "policy" rules, the Mayor
is given neither the power to directly or by veto participate
in their adoption, but he is given a clear ministerial duty to
carry them out.

Section 10-3-1219.

It is this last class of

express powers given to the Council that Respondents urge is
the proper realm of council administration by resolution.

(2)

REPLY TO:

"This legislation [Chapter 8, Title 10)
only grants the governmental entity
the specified power--it says nothing
about the manner of its exercise.
[Appellant's Brief at 9-10.)
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Appellant misreads the statute.

A close look at

Chapter 8, indicates that the initial Section states:
The boards of commissioners and city councils
of cities shall have the power to control the
finances and property of the corporation.
Section 10-8-1.

Subsequent Sections of this Chapter all

begin with simply the words "they" which is a clear and
unmistakable reference back to the initial Section.

The

draftsman's original form has been clouded by revisions,
codifications and annotations but it appears reasonably clear
that each use of the word "they" refers back to the first

sec~'..

However, when subsequent Sections were added, the draftsmen
short-circuited the original form and simply used the word
"governing body" instead of "they" as was used in the older
Sections.

See Section 10-8-8.1.
In appears to Respondents that the "governing body"

form in Section 10-8-8.1 is interchangeable with the "they"
used in the remainder of the Chapter.

Under Respondent's

interpretation the Municipal Council would have all these powe
unless they are expressly given the Mayor by the Optional

For~

of Municipal Government Act.
Appellant makes much of insignificant linguistic
forms such as Chapter 8.

Are we to presume that the alloca-

tions of municipal power in Logan's form of government are to
be determined in such a manner?

Appellant's methodology and

conclusions as exhibited in the example presented should be
contrasted with Respondents' argument that the Logan Municip~
Council has those municipal powers not specifically given th 2
Mayor
in
Section
10-3-1219.
Sponsored by
the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27(3)

REPLY TO:

"Second i t divided this vested governmental power into its executive and
legislative comoo~ents for the first
time."
[Appellant's Brief at 12.]

Appellant mistates what occurred.

Prior to the

Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act there was a division
of legislative and executive powers but the same persons
exercised a dual role.

See Section 10-3-101 setting up both

legislative and executive powers in the governing body and then
separating the same by the manner of their exercise.

By Section

10-3-701 legislative power is to be exercised by ordinance; by
Section 10-3-717 administrative power is to be exercised by
resolution; and by Sections 10-3-801 et

~·

executive powers

are exercised through supervision of departments.
division cannot be formulated.

A clearer

The Optional Forms of Municipal

Government Act simply vests the supervision of departments and
certain limited and enumerated administrative tasks in the mayor.

(4)

REPLY TO:

"The 1977 legislature added 'clarificacations '"
[Appellant's Brief at 12.]

Respondent notes that there is no indication whatsoever
in the record as to the legislatures intentions with respect to
the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act.

Respondent was

prepared at the trial level to deal with this issue by proffering evidence which would have shown:
1.

The linguistic modifications were not called to the

legislators attention.

There is no legislative history whatso-

ever, and furtherthe changes were regarded as insignificant.
2.

The modifications were actually made unilaterally

and secretly
by Appellant on a rough draft copy after the
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commencement of the? instant dispu:e pur.c;

ua~1t

to '1 i.:; po::; i ti):':

as First Vice President of the 1Jta:1 League of Citios and '~o·:;r"·

(5)

REPLY TO:

"In short, where the zeneral municioal
laws are consistent with the councilmayor form, tney are to be literally
applied.
Where they are not consistent,
they are superc0ded and modi'.'ied to th~
extent of incompatibilit.J."
[Aopellant• 3
Brief ar; 14.]

Appellant has it backwards.

The Optional Forms of

Municipal Governments Act specifically states:
All existing statutes governing municioalities
shall remain applicable except; as provided in
this part.
Section 10-3-1204.

Clearly unless an existing general munici:;:_

statute is specifically modified it still applies.
its face clearly recognizes this distinction.

The Act oc

In Section

10-3-1219(3) the Optional Forms Act specifically makes

referen~

to Utah's municipal laws providing for appointment of cori:;1itte'j
by the governing body and modifies that law by spucifically
providing the Mayor shall make all such appointments.

,

Such a

careful effort to apply and modify existing state law negates
an interpretation that municipalities were to be cast upon

me~' I

definitions to determine powc;rs of the Mayor vis-a-vis the

I

Council.
There is no indication or even inference that
municipal powers are to be categorized and then divided into
"executive," "administrative" and "legislative" pid;o;eon holes.
The awesome nature of such a task vrnuld si!ni)lj oven1helm one.
For example, the zoning and plannin~ power::; would so~eh~~
to be categorized.

hJ\

An error in this division would cause t~c
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city's exercise of these zoning powers to be ultra vires,
and voidable.

Such an uncharted and vaguely defined system

oased solely on defining "executive" vis-a-vis "legislative"
would invite litigation, be impossible to control and a very
3tron~

reason not to adopt any such optional form of government.

REPLY TO:

(6)

"The law now specifically provides that
there is no governing body under the
council-mayor form of government."
[Appellant's Brief at 16.J

Respondent respectfully disagrees.

Section 10-3-101

doesn't indicate there is "no governing body" in council-mayor
cities, it just states that the governing body in such cities
does not generally exercise both legislative and executive
powers.

Read in conjunction with Section 10-3-1209, it merely

indicates that the Council and Mayor together form what was
previously known as the "governing body," the Mayor having
those governing powers given him in Section 10-3-1219 and the
Council having all other governing powers.

The changed wording

is appropriate and correct for some of the powers formerly
given only to the governing body are now specifically given to
the Mayor.

For example, the power to administer municipal

employees under the old form of government was vested in the
"governing body."

Under the Optional Forms of Municipal Govern-

ment Act, that power, except for some restrictions, is vested in
the Mayor.

See Section 10-3-1219 (6) and (7).

In that sense,

the Mayor becomes part of what was formerly the "governing body."
More fundamentally there is a political shallowness
in this contention by Appellant.

The original Optional Forms

of Municipal
Act
specifically
unequivocally
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- 30provided that the Municipal Council was the governing body:
"Governing body" means the le3;islative body of
any city or town organized under the Act.
Original Section 10-6-104(2);
The municipal council of a municipality adopting
an optional form of government provided for in
this act shall be the governing body of that
municipality .
Original Section 10-6-113.

When the citizens of Logan receive',

their ballots and voted to inaugurate this new system they

fc~.

these words describing the new form of government:
The council would be the governing body of Logan
City .
The Mayor's primary functions would
be to enforce ordinances, execute policies adopted
by the Council .
T.R. at 346.

If merely dropping the linguistic words "governi:: 1

body" fundamentally changed the entire substance and form of
this municipal government there rises the question of whether
Logan's citizens freely chose such a system.

( 7)

REP LY TO :

"This Court will have declared that there
are no options of government available
to municipalities."
[Appellant's Brief
at 14.]

Appellant mistates Respondents' position.

Respondent:

view the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act as providi::
for centralized administrative control and responsibility in a
single individual, the Mayor.

This system is new in Utah and

is in wide use in many other states.

See Part I(C), supra

discussing municipal government forms in New Jersey, NeH Mexic:,
Ohio, etc., where statutes of similar import are in effect.
Act as interpreted by Respondents provides a realistic, workabl
alternative to the existing commission form.
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Response to Burtenshaw/Baird Brief--Points I-VI
(1)

REPLY TO:

"The state legislature intended to create
. a unique functional arrangement."
[Burtenshaw/Baird Brief at 5.]

Respondents note here and generally that Appellants
and both Amicus Curiae are confusing two separate forms, the one
being the "federal plan" which is a miniature

federal system

with strict executive and legislative divisions with a second
form which is generally referred to as the strong mayor or
managerial form.
If Burtenshaw/Baird are asserting the "federal plan"
is new or unique they are incorrect.

The "federal plan" munici-

pal form was at one time popular in this country:
The story of American municipal government in
the nineteenth century forms a gloomy chapter
in our national history.
In a period of
great economic development there was enormous
growth both in number and size of urban
communities. This was not matched, however,
by progress in the development of municipal
government.
Municipal organization was strongly
affected by popular antipathy to concentration
of authority.
There was a tendency to imitate
the organization of state government, particularly
in applying the idea of checks and balances. This
was evident as early as 1789, in the case of
Philadelphia. The city's charter of that year
created a bicameral governing body and the mayor
became an independent executive without membership in either branch of the council . .
The complicated system thus constructed bred
irresponsibility, political interference,
inefficiency and corruption.

J. Fordham, Local Government Law, at 19-20 (Rev. Ed. 1975).
In the second stage of development [referring
to municipal forms], the form of municipal
government generally adopted was a complete
copy in miniature of the government of the
United States or of a state. The mayor was
merely the chief executive officer with no
legislative power except that of veto.
The
municipal council, usually a bicameral body,
wasby thestripped
of Funding
all forexecutive
authority
and
Sponsored
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-32confined itself to making appropriations of
the public funds and enacting policy regulations .
The wastefulness and corruntion
to which this system of divided resoonsibility
led finally brou~ht people to realize that the
administration of the affairs of a "'reat
municipality is more nearly analogo~s to the
conduct of a busin~ci~ than to the government
of a sovereign state .

56 Am Jur 2d, 11unicipal Corpor:l'.::ions, etc.
(emphasis added).
It is Respondents'

139 at 193-94.

argument that the Optional Forms

of Municipal Government Act was not intended to create a miniature federal government in Logan City.

A careful comparison

of the powers and duties of the elected Mayor and the appointed
Manager in the Act reveals the Mayor has slightly more latitud2
but it also reveals the similar nature of their enumerated
duties and functions.

Compare Section 10-3-1219 with Section

10-3-1226.

I(D).

Response to Legislative Council Brief--Points I-II
(1)

REPL.Y TO:

"In .
Section 10-3-1219 .
. we find
that the Mayor shall be the chief
executive and administrative officer.
By virtue of that declaration, the mayor
is empowe" ed to perform certain administr 0•
tive functions and these functions, in
accordance with the separation of powers
doctrine, are to be performed essential~
unencumbered by legislative restraint."
[Legislative Counsel Brief at 11.]
0

Respondents agree that the enumerated powers in
Section 10-3-1219 are not to be encumbered by legislative
restraint.

However, the Brief errs in presuming the mere titB

"chief executive and administrative officer" ipso facto confer
a broad range of other powers.

If that is so Hhy is there an

enumeration in Section 10-3-1219?

Furthermore, as previou 3 l;
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-33noted the only indication which is given that the Mayor has any
powers other than those enumerated is Part ( 9) of Section
10-3-1219 which refers only to other powers given "in this part"
which is a clear reference to the Act itself.

These other

powers in that part would be power to veto, Section 10-3-1214;
power to appoint a chief administrative officer, Section 10-31220; power to propose an administrative code, Section 10-3-1221;
power to call meetings, Section 10-3-1212, etc.
More interesting is to pose the question of why does
Section 10-3-1219(9) refer to "other powers conferred by this
part" when other sections of the same Act clearly indicate the
Mayor is to perform additional duties.

There is only one answer

and that is because Section 10-3-1219 is generally intended to
be an exclusive and exhaustive list of all powers of the Mayor.

POINT II
APPELLANT MAYOR HAS NO AUTHORITY TO BUY, SELL OR EXCHANGE
MUNICIPAL REAL PROPERTY WITHOUT NOTICE TO, OR APPROVAL BY, THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL.
[Including Responses to Appellant Point II, Burtenshaw/Baird
Points I-VI.)
Respondents urge this Court that Appellant's brief
mistates and obfuscates the issue before this Court with respect
to the property issue.

The lower court's ruling did not deal

with "management" of city property nor was that issue ever
before the lower court.
sell and exchange.

The only issue was the power to buy,

Fur~her,

the lower court did not enter the

thicket of describing "executive functiGns," the court simply
and succinctly held that under Utah

muni~ipa:

law the Logan

Municipal Council has authority over the sale, purchase and
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exchange of municipal real property.

The is3ue now before

this Court on appeal is simply whether the

~ayor

Council-Mayor government form, may buy, sell or

under thi 3
exchan~e

municipal real property without notice, or approval by, the
Municipal Council.

II(A). The trial court does not concern itself with "ma;iac:ement" of municipal real property.
Prior to 1976,

Lo~an

City conducted its property

transactions as did other Utah municipalities.

The Logan Cit;

Commission would discuss the relevant property transaction in
a meeting and pass a resolution to purchase, sell, or exci1ane;e
the particular property.

The Mayor with this authorization

would then proceed to convey the property by signing a deed on
behalf of the municipality reciting in the acknowledgment his
authority given by a resolution of the Logan City Commission.
Purchases similarly authorized would also be completed by the
Mayor.
Upon the implementation of the council-mayor government form in Logan pursuant to the Optional Forms of Municipal
Government Act, Appellant asserted his exclusive right over
property transactions, alleging it was an "e':ecuti ve function",
and,as such,his sole prerogative.

Most indicative of

t~e

~~rameters of this assertion is the acknowledgment form used

by Appellant on municipal deeds grgnting property:
On the 14th day of June A.D. 1976 person~-"
appeared before me Desmond L. Anderson a:
Venal Jones who, being by me duly sworn,
i
say that they are the Mayor and City Sec~
er
res~
·:ively of the City of Logan and that
sai Law Library.
1strument
was
signed
behalf
of sail
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- 35corporation by authority of Optional Forms
of Municioal Government Act and the aforesaid officers acknowledged to me that said
corporation executed the same.
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Chairman Larsen, T.R. at 42 (emphasis
added); see also T.R. at 39, paragraph 5.

When members of the

Council objected, the City Attorney affirmed the Mayor's
position.

T.R. at 46.

The dispute included not only authority

to buy, sell, or exchange real property but whether notice had
to be given the Council.

The city Attorney finally did acknow-

ledge that the Council could, by ordinance, require notice be
given to it of real property transactions.

e.

Amidst the continuing

debate over authority Logan City Ordinance 1-6-6 was passed
requiring notice be given to the Municipal Council with respect
to property transactions.

T.R. at 213.

The members of Municipal Council, Respondents herein,
concurrently requested the City Attorney to seek an opinion from
the Utah Attorney General's Office with respect to whether an
additional ordinance requiring Council approval to engage in
property transactions would be legal.
T.R. at 214.

See proposed ordinance,

That request to the Attorney General, dated

October 12th, 1976, expressed the opinion of the City Attorney
that such Council control "would completely destroy the form of
government we have in Logan City."

T.R. at 20.

The Attorney

General's Opinion written by Jack L. Crellin, dated November
4th, 1976, fully supported the Council, concluding:
It is, therefore, my opinion t~at the Mun~c~pal
Council can indeed pass an ordinance requiring
the Mayor to secure the approval of the council
before either purchasing or selling real
property and any attempt by the mayor to do
otherwise would be invalid.
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-36T.R. at 43-45.

That Attorney General's Opinion was cor:imunicat,

to the Council by the City Attorney along with his letter

.

disputing that opinion and Appellant onenly characterized the
opinion as not being worthy of a first year law student. T.R.
at 51-53.
The Mayor then vetoed the proposed ordinance

stati~:

The Municipal Council may not, by ordinance or
otherwise, confer upon itself administrative
powers.
This ordinance exceeds the limits
of power granted the Council by that [Optional
Forms of Municipal Government Act).
It is an
unlawful and unwarranted intrusion by the
legislative branch, or Municipal Council, into
the powers of the executive branch.
T.R. at 56 (emphasis added); see proposed ordinance, T.R. at 2'.Under these circumstances, this legal issue was then
placed before the trial court in Respondents' second claim for
relief which sought a determination as to whether the Mayor
could buy, sell, or exchange real property without notice to,
or authority from, the Municipal Council.

Eventually, the Coor

granted summary judgment to Respondents holding in its Memorandum Decision that control over real estate transactions
belongs to the Municipal Council.

Memorandum Decision, T.R.

at 301-303; Partial Summary Judgment, T.R. at 348-350; Final
Summary Judgment, T.R. at 441-42, 448-49.

Nothing dealing with

management was ever before the court.

II(B).

The Municipal Council possesses plenary control over
the sale, exchange and purchase of municipal real
property
Section 10-8-1 specifically vests control of propert,

ofSponsored
the bymunicipal
corporation in "boards of commissioners and c'
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-37councils of cities."

Section 10-8-2 indicates these same

entities ''may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey,
and dispose of property, real and personal

II

The

Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act nowhere alters or
speaks to this allocation of power and responsibility.

The

Mayor's duties enumerated in Section 10-3-1219 do not indicate
or even imply any power over real property.

There is wording

in the Optional Forms Act itself which implies that the Council
retains plenary authority over property, for it states "the
council may hold executive sessions, but only for the purpose
of discussion of personnel, land acquisitions, or lawsuits.
Section 10-3-1212 (emphasis added).

Of course the direct grant

of this power is in Section 10-8-1 which power is given to the
Council by Section 10-3-1204.
Without belaboring this property issue, Respondents
note that its discussion of Point I of its Brief, supra, relied
upon the property issue as a continuing example in its presentation.

See particularly Part I(C), supra, dealing with other

state statutes providing alternate government forms and real
property control systems therein.

II(C).

The Municipal Council power to specifically approve
real property transactions cannot be delegated.
The general rule is that the governing body's power

to approve real property transactions cannot be delegated to
others.

~'

City of Bowling Green v. B'd of Education, 278

SW2d 726 (Ky. 1975), Jamoneau v. Local Government B'd, 78 A2d
553 (N.J. 1951).

In determining what particular functions may

be delegated,
is Law
generally
held provided
thatby the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unless a statute specifically provides oth~r
wise, legislative and discretionary powers, as
vested in the governin~ body of a municipality
cannot be delegated by such a body to the
administrative officials of the municipality.
Commonly when the exercise of the discrc::tion
is involved, the municipal council cannot
delegate the power of enacting policy re~uia
tions, of enacting or enforcing building
regulations, of determinln~ what public
improvements shall be undertaken, and the
character and ex~ent of sucn improvements, of
approving of certain acts, of selling
municipal bonds, of purchasing fire equipment,
of entering into contracts generally, or of
leveeing of tax.

56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations

§

196.

The quotation,

supra, indicates numerous functions considered too

discretio~-"'

to be delegated, for example, it indicates "determining ':1hat
public improvements shall be undertaken, and the character and
extent of such improvements."

In the matter at hand we do

n~:

discuss mere improvements but the sale, purchase and exchange
of real property with values of $300,000 and $200,000 each,
discretionary transations involving the future operation and
financial stability of a municipality.
Under the Optional Forms of ilunicipal Government Act
the Mayor is the chief administrative officer.

To presume th2:

a mere general budgetary allowance, for example, an appropriation of funds for the purchase of park land, is sufficient
authorization to vest the Mayor with complete authority to
negotiate, select and purchase specific tracts is an excessive
interpretation of the vesting of discretionary judgment in f 10
Mayor.

Respondents as a majority of the Municipal Council de:iJ

any intention to vest or delegate such power in the Mayor.
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--39II(D).

The Municipal

Co~ncil

should approve municipal real

property transactions by resolution and transactions
should be openly and fairly conducted.
Transactions involving municipal real property are
properly authorized by Municipal Council resolution.

The agency

"to sell or otherwise dispose of real estate must be expressly
authorized.

11

3 Arn Jur 2d, Agency

City, 356 P2d 631,

§

117.

In Stone v. Salt Lake

(Ut. 1960) this Court held a resolution

to be proper authorization for the sale of real property in
contrast with an ordinance.
An interpretation conferring unilateral authority upon
the Mayor to buy, sell and exchange real property avoids the
necessity of a public hearing, notice and a reasonable opportunity
for those interested to appear and be heard.

Vesting one

individual with the complete and total power to buy, sell
and trade avoids the critical opportunity for citizenry
participation and reaction to one of the most important exercises
of power on the local level.

The Appellant has actually pur-

ported to conduct many real estate transactions with no notice
or participation from even the Municipal Council much less from
the citizens of Logan.
In Stone v. Salt Lake City, 356 P2d 631, 638 (Ut.
1960) this Court indicated the proper manner of conducting
sales of real property:
We are entirely in accord with the contention
that it is desirable and proper that sales
of such public property be openly and fairly
conducted.
The essential of procedural requirements of that character is that there be notice,
a reasonable opportunity for those interested to
appear and be heard, and that fairness in the
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-40procedure in connection with the sale be
observed .
. its procedure in publicizing
the proposal, holding a public meeting,
adopting a resolution .
. soliciting
bids for its sale encompasses the basic
elements of propriety in dealing with such
public business.
The requirements of the Stone case appear entirely

appropri~e

and of equal application to purchases and exchanges of
real property.

munic0~

Antieau comments that, "exchanges are generallJ

treated like sales as far as the notice provisions are concerned." 2A Antieau

§

20.19 at p. 74.10.

In the instant matte:-

numerous sales and exchanges have been conducted without any
resolution, notice or public hearing.

For example, the Baugh

purchase, the Hirschi purchase and the exchange with the L.D.2.
church on August 24th, 1976.

All three of these critic al tram-

actions were entered into without any notice to, or public
hearing for, the citizens of Logan.

The Municipal Council,

itself, was merely informed after the fact.

II(E).

T.R. at 38.

The Municipal Council and previous Logan City Commissio:r
stand as trustees of municipal real property.
Antieau comments that "municipal corporations can

have accountings against officers and employees when the
municipal authorities believe that governmental properties have
been misappropriated.

2A Antieau,

§

22.10 at p. 249.

The

general rule everywhere is that a public office is a trust and
a public official is a fiduciary.
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-41II(F).

Response to Appellant's Brief - Point II

(1)

REPLY TO:

"However a determination that Tract A
should be sold by the city to John Doe
is not a legislative act; it is an
executive act."
[Appellant's Brief
at 21.]

Respondents disagree.

The decision in a municipality

of whether Tract A should or should not be sold is a matter of
policy.

How can the Council adopt a policy of park expansion

if it can't control which property the Mayor sells?

The sale,

purchase and exchange of municipal real property is at the
critical nub of policy.

Of course, once the city has determined

as a matter of policy that Tract A should be sold then the Mayor
would probably be directed to sell it and administratively might
initiate procedures to implement this policy. It is of little
import to policy whether John Doe or Richard Roe buys the
property.

Even so, the deed given should properly recite in

its acknowledgment the authority given, preferably by a specific
resolution, to the mayor to sell Tract A.
The critical nature of this policy determination
becomes even more apparent when purchases are considered.

The

Appellant would have the Court believe it is merely an executive
act whether Tract A or Tract B is purchased for the city.
contention is hardly worth stating.

That

Quite obviously there is

a critical policy determination involved.
Unfortunately, these are not abstract considerations
in the instant case, Appellant actually purchased and sold large
tracts belonging to Logan City without notice to or authority
from the Municipal Council.

T.R. at 38-40.

For example, lands

were purchased, ostensibly for a new downtown park, at a total
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-42cost in excess of

~300,000.00.

tion involved in the decision to locate a $300,000.00 park
within three blocks of
developmen+:.s?

fou~

other parks and recreational

Appellant would have the ";urt believe that the

mere appropriation of monies for park purchases is

suff~cicnt

authority for him to unilaterally select and purchase any e;i·19 c
site.
(2)

REPLY TO:

Appellant's referendur;i argument, to \·1it:
That because referendums are sometimes
required for sales 01 real prooertv in
other states, such sales are "ad::iinistrative" and not "legislative" acts.
[Appellant's Brief at 22.]

Appellant's argument is built on sand.

Underlying

this entire argument is the assumption that the Municipal Counc'..1
is purely a legislative body having no administrative powers.

I

Respondents have repeatedly denied that argument, noting in
conjunction therewith that original Section 10-6-116 express~
referred to passage of resolutions by the Council which by
Section 10-3-717 are for the purpose of exercising administrati:'-1
acts.

For example, Section 10-3-1217 expressly describes the

mode whereby the Council can deal with certain administrative
affairs concerning municipal employees.
The one salient conclusion that Appellant's
referendum argument does lead to, is that various States have
been so concerned about the sale of real property that they ha·'
required municipalities to put it to a public referendum.
That determination hardly bodes well for Appellant's

argume~=

that he has complete and exclusive authority, unilateral!;,
to buy, sell and exchange municipal real property.
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-4 3(3)

REPLY TO:

Hardly.

"Logan municipal council expressed its
recognition of the fact that the sale
and purchase of property is an executive
functic~ not within the jursidiction of
the council."
[Appellant's Brief at 24.]
Respondents did pass legislation requiring,

at a minimum, notice.

It should be noted that they were given

questionable legal advice by the City Attorney to the effect
that any effort to pass an ordinance or obtain legal remedies
restricting or interfering with the Mayor's exercise of his
purported "executive right" to unilaterally buy, sell, and
exchange real property would constitute a violation for which
they could possibly lose their council seats. T.R. at 51-53,
82.

See Section 10-3-1217 (last sentence).
What the Respondent Council members did is immediately

pass legislation requiring notice.

The City Attorney having

informed them this step was permissible.

Next the Respondent

Council members demanded the City Attorney immediately seek a
written opinion on this issue from the Attorney General's
_,
'ii

Office.

See Part II(A), supra, which opinion indicated the

City Attorney was, in the opinion of that office, wrong.

They

then passed, by majority vote, legislation demanding that the
Mayor obtain authorization for sales, purchases and exchanges
of municipal real property.

When the Mayor vetoed that

ordinance, groundwork for the instant action was commenced.
Respondents do not understand how Appellant is able to gleen
from these facts or the ordinance in question an admittance by
Respondents of such authority on the part of the Mayor.
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POHJT III
THE MUNICIPAL Cu\JNC IL IS THE 11 WVERIJIIJG BODY 11 AS THAT TEPJ.1 IS
USED IN THE MUNICIPAL FISCAL PROCEDURES ACT.
[Including Responses to App2llant and Burtc;,1shaw/Baird, ge:1 eral
Appellant has not chosen

~c

J:'._rsc~l:r

-1

appeal the rulir.;j

of the trial court with respect to the issues raised in this
Point, Respondents' third claim for relief.

However, there are

rather broad and unspecific attacks by Appellant on the whole
theory of there even being a governing body.
at 16.

Appellant's Brief,

In addition, Appellant urges that all powers should be

divided into executive and legislative fuctions.

Further,

Appellant's Brief, Point IV, mistates certain issues and calls
into question determinations made under this Point.

The

Burtenshaw/Baird Brief also levels a general attack at the
trial court ruling.

e~~

Under these circumstances Respondent

requests a ruling by this Court reaffirming the determination
of the trial court.
The critical issues inherent in this third claim for
relief were decided by the trial court upon Respondents' motion
for summary judgment.

Appellant entered a general denial and

alleged merely that the practices complained of had been "the
established practice for a good number of years."

T. R. at 126.

The court held that interfund and inter-departmental transfers
required approval of the Municipal Council, intr'..'-departmental
transfers required only the approval of the Mayor and budget
officer.
III(A).

T.R. at 443-44.
The Municipal Council muct authorize interfund and
interdepartmental tr_

.

~rs.
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-45T'.1 • ·;:1 i corm Municipal Fi,~cal Procedures Act, Sections
10-10-23 et.

~-,

establishes

uniforo and sound fiscal procedures for the
adoption and administration of budgets . . .
that budgets may be balanced . . . [and]
specifies the manner in which appropriations
for various municipal activities are made and
controls the expenditure thereof .
. to
ensure that executive staffs administer their
respective functions in accordance with those
plans, and to permit taxpayers and investors
to form intelligent opinions based on sufficient
information as to the financial oolicies and
administration of the city
'
Section 10-10-24.

The procedures in the Act are at the heart of

the individual citizen's right to information about, and control
of, the municipality which governs him; to the accomplishment
of "this purpose, the provisions of this law shall be broadly
construed."

Section 10-10-24.

The Act requires public approval

by the "governing body" of a "tentative budget," a waiting
period of "at least ten days," availability of the tentative
budget for inspection, published notice of a public hearing
.at which all interested

and a "public hearing on the budget .

persons shall be given the opportunity to be heard" at the
conclusion of which the budget may be

finally adopted.

Sections

lJ-10-34 et. ~Quite obviously the careful and meticulous procedures
of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act would be
circumvented by the allowance of unpublicized fund transfers
by municipal officers after the adoption of the final budget.
This is what has occurred in Logan City; it occurred without
public notice or hearing to the public.

The Municipal Council,

itself, was never notified nor was its approval sought; the
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transfers were done by Lo[;an er:ployoes under
Appellant.

th·~

direction of

T.R. at 72.
The Fiscal Procedures Act specifically requires that
t~

the governing body approve transfers causing an increase in

general fund budget only after notice and a public hearinz, a
prccedure similar in form to the adoption of the "final
budget."

Compare Sections 10-10-52 et.

10-10-34 et. ~·

~-

with Sections

To presume that "the governing body" in the

Act's usage is not the Municipal Council ignores the express
language of the Optional Forms of Municipal GovernMent Act

a~

the tenor and approach of the Uniform f·1unicipal Fiscal Procedrc:
I

Act.

The result of such a premise is to allow a Mayor complete '

freedom to reallocate the budget without any semblance of noti::
or public hearing.

III(B).

The Mayor's sole power as to interfund and interdepartmental transfers and other appropriation
ordinances is the veto power.
Section 10-3-1214 of the Optional Forms of Municipal

Government Act slightly modifies the manner of budgeting
municipal funds, it allows the Mayor specific veto power.

As

the Mayor is given this power in regard to "appropriation
ordinances" it is proper to regard him as having the same
authority as to interfund transfers and interdepartmental
transfers within the same fund.

To allow either the Mayor or

Municipal Council to obtain some superior leverage or power in
subsequent alterations of a "final budget" would render nugat-c:'
their power in regard to the initial adoption of the "final
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-47III(C).

Response to Appellant's Brief -- Point I, IV

(1)

REPLY TO:

Argument that all powers should be
functionally divided.
[Appellant's
Brief at 16-17.]

Appellant at one point argues there is no governing
body and that all such usages of the term in former statutes
require a division of those powers into executive and legislative
molds.

Appellant's Brief at 8-19.

Section 10-3-1219 (6) of

the Optional Forms Act specifically provides:
Appoint a budget officer for the purpose of conforming with the requirements of the uniform
municipal fiscal procedures act and in all
other respects fulfill the requirements of
that act.
(Emphasis added.)

Respondents note initially that a careful

reading of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act, Section
10-10-23 et.

~-

reveals a constant usage of the term "govern-

ing body" throughout.

See,~'

Sections 10-10-33, et.

~-

Appellant would presumably have the Court examine each statute
to pidgeonhole the various executive or legislative functions.
Respondents urge that by Section 10-3-1214 the Mayor has a
defined veto right in respect to "appropriation ordinances";
that is the power given the Mayor by the Optional Forms of
Municipal Government Act and that is his limit.

( 2)

REPLY TO:

Appellant's Statement of Point IV.
[Appellant's Brief at 28.J

Respondents note that Appellant's statement of
Point IV restates a holding of the trial court.

T.R. at 444.

Respondents do not dispute that holding nor have they ever
disputed it.

However, as to the arguments in Point IV of

Appellant's Brief, Respondents dispute the same.

See
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Respondents' Point VIII, infra.

-48POINT IV
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL MUST APPROVE PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS
INNERBLOCK DEVELOPMENTS AND CLUSTER D'.::'!ELOP'tE::r':'s AS STJBDI'!ISirc

""~'

[Including Responses to Appellant Point III.]
In this claim for relief Respondents sought a ruling
1

that the approval and filing of a subdivision plat required
Council approval.

T.R. at 6.

At the evidenciary hearing the~

was a discussion of this issue and Appellant stipulated that
under Logan's ordinance interblock developments, cluster
developments and planned unit developments were governed by
state subdivision law.

Transcriot at 118-119; T.R. at 393.

M

the conclusion of that hearing it was agreed this issue would
be presented to the court in legal memorandums.
at 140-142.

Transcript

Respondent's Memorandum, T. R. at 372.

Memorandum, T.R. at 393.

Appellant'' [

Thus, the issue before this Court

is whether Logan City subdivisions must be approved by the
Logan Municipal Council, it being conceded by Appellant that
interblock developments, cluster developments and planned

u~t

developments are subdivisions under state law.

IV(A).

The Municipal Council has plenary control over
subdivision approval.
There are three fundamental state statutes that

control.

The pertinent parts of Section 17-21-8 provide as

follows:
It shall be unlawful for any recorder to record
any map or plat of a subdivision of land
situated in any city or town until the same
shall have been approved by the legislative
authority of the city or town in which such
land may be situated .
For each and
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-49every violation of this section by any recorder,
his deputies or employees, the recorder shall
forfeit and pay to the county the sum of $200.
(Emphasis added.)

The pertinent parts of Section 57-5-3

provide as follows:
Such map or plat shall be acknowledged by such
owner before some officer authorized by law to
take the acknowledgment of conveyances or real
estate, and certified by the surveyor making
such plat; if the land is situated in any city
or incorporated town such plat or map shall be
approved by its governing body, or by some
city or town officer for that purpose designated
by resolution or ordinance of such governing
body; and, if the land is situated outside of
any city or incorporated town, shall be approved
by the board of county commissioners of the
county, or by some county officer for that
purpose designated by resolution or ordinance
of such board. When so acknowledged, certified
and approved, it shall be filed and recorded in
the office of the county recorder of the county.
(Emphasis added.)

Section 10-9-25 provides as follows:

From and after the time when the planning commission
of any municipality shall have adopted a major
street plan and shall have certified the same to
the legislative body, no plat of a subdivision of
land lying within the municipality shall be filed
or recorded in the county recorder's office until
it shall have been submitted to and approved~
the said planning commission and legislative body,
and such approval entered in writing on the plat
by the secretary of the planning commission and
clerk of the legislative body, or other designated
members or employees.
No county recorder shall
file or record a plat of a subdivision without
such approval, and any county recorder so doing
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
The
filing or recording of a plat of a subdivision
without such approval shall be void.
In exercising the powers granted to it by the act, the
planning commission shall prepare regulations
governing the subdivision of land within the
municipality.
A public hearing thereon shall be
held by the legislative body, after which the
legislative body may adopt said regulations for
the municipality.
(Emphasis added.)
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-SJThe first and second statut::s, supY·::i., aopear with
the same legislative history going back to revised statutes
of

1898.

The first, Section

17-21-8, is an affirmative

rnanda~

contained in the law pertaining to County Recorders requiring
"approval by le.;is la ti ve authority of a city" before recorjine;
with no delegation mentioned.

The second, Section

57-5-3, is

contained in the Real Estate Plats and Subdivisions Section
I

of the Utah Code. It gives the approval power to the "governin;'
body or some city officer for that purpose designated by
resolution or ordinance of such govcor;;ing body."
These first two statutes if taken in their most
favorable light toward Appellant's position and without considering the third statute, a later enactment, require the
specific delegation by resolution or ordinance of the approval
power of the Council to an officer of the City.
A reading of the Logan City ordinances interpreted
by the trial court clearly illuminates (a) the absence of any
acknowledgment of the authority of the Council under either
Section

17-21-8 or Section 57-5-3; and, (b) the absence of

a~

express delegation of the unacknowledged authority; and, (c)
a complete absence of any awareness or knowledge of the require·
ments under Sections

17-21-8 and 57-5-3, for recording plats

in the County Recorder's office.

There is no reasonable inte~

pretation of the Logan City ordinances

tha~

by them,the

Municipal Council delegates aC<thori ty to the Mayor for approva:
of the plats as a prerequisite for recording in the County
Recorder's office.

It should be noted that Respondents as a

majority of the Council have by this action denied
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-51IV(B).

The municipal power to approve subdivisions is non
delegable.
The non-delegability of the Council's power to approve

subdivisions is clear when viewed in conjunction with the third
statute, Section 10-9-25, which was enacted in 1945, fifty years
after the other two enactments.

That statute referring to

cities such as Logan with "Major street plan(s)" affirms that
in those cities
[N]o plat of a subdivision of land lying within
the municipality shall be filed or recorded in
the county recorder's office until it shall
have been submitted to and approved by the said
planning commission and legislative body.
Section 10-9-25 (emphasis added).
This provision expressly negates any contention that
the legislative body could delegate that authority.

The

questions as to interpretation of delegability are then left
only for resolution as to cities without major street plans.
That power is clearly non-delegable in Logan City.
This matter is serious and contemplates consequences
beyond internal city operations.

Section 10-9-25 makes it a

misdemeanor for the County Recorder to accept and record plats
not so approved.

Why?

Because properly approved plats are a

prerequisite for title to the public who will be buying lots or
buildings in subdivisions.

Non-compliance with that Section

makes the plat void.
IV(C).

Response to Appellant - Point III

(1)

REPLY TO:

"However as the statute specifically uses
the term 'legislative body' under the
division of powers doctrine, this power
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of final approval undoubtedly is
vested in the council."
[.Appellant's
Brief at 26. J
Respondents note the mistaken significance which
Appellant now ties to the mere words "legislati·ve bod:;."

Thos~

terms like "chief executive" are used not to define functions
but as a generic name to identify a given governmental entitJ.
It isn't difficult to recogni:::e t:,c.t the term "legislative bod/
was used by the draftsmen to indicate, not function, i.e., as
opposed to "executive," but the relevant governmental body to
exercise powers given in the Zoning Chapter, Sections 10-9-1
et.

~-,

further, that "boards of commissioners and city

councils" were descriptive not functional terms used to descriC:
that same entity as to general powers.
~·

Sections 10-8-1 et.

Indeed a careful look at Chapter 8 will show that there

is no functional symmetry as to why certain sections begin
with "they" and thereby refer back to "boards of city
commissioners and city councils" and others begin by usine; the
term "governing body."

The difference is solely one of age

and accident, the original statutes use "they," later
amendments use "governing body."

Compare Section 10-8-8 with

Section 10-8-8.1, the former being enacted in 1898 and the
latter in 1953.
Given that Appellant is now willing to recognize tha:
some of the usages of the terms "legislative body," ":;overnin~
body," etc. are devoid of substance and are merely to identify,
how can Appellant continue to assert that the mere use of tlie
words "chief administrative officer" and "executive dep2rtment'
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-53must be thoroughly substantive to the derogation of all
established municipal laws and practices.
(2)

REPLY TO:

"The trial court, however, held that, as
the state statute specifically delegates
to the "legislative body" the authority
to approve subdivision plats, this
function cannot be delegated." [Appellant's
Brief at 27.]

Appellant's assertion here is that the trial court's
ruling is based on an erroneous assumption that legislative
powers are nondelegable.

This is hardly a fair characteriza-

tion of the trial court's reasoning.

"Legislative body" is

used as a code word for Council not only in this Section but
throughout Chapter 9 of Title 10, and such use has nothing to
do with what nature or kind of power is actually being given.
The trial court did not discuss nor even consider
any broad "legislative delegability" doctrines, it simply read
and followed the obvious import of Section 10-9-25 which
requires among other things:

submission to and approval by

the legislative body; such approval entered in writing by clerk
of legislative body; and a public hearing by the legislative
body.

The court didn't have to deal with whether the power

was "legislative" or not, quite obviously the specific requirements of the Section indicated it was not a delegable duty.
How can any public body delegate a duty when a state statute
specifically requires that specific body by name to have a
public hearing, to by name approve the submission and to enter
such approval by its own named clerk.
Appellant here again finds substance in words such
as "legislative body" where there is none.

Quite obviously the
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-54the U3e of that term in Section 10-9-25 hil3 nothing to do
with whether the exercised power is "legislative" or
in nature, it is 3imply a name.

"execu~:-..

Appellant doe3n' t ::;eem toge·

beyond the conception that fellows named Shoemaker and Miller
must milke shoes and grind wheat.

POINT V
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL CAN RETAIN OUTSIDE COUNSEL TO REPRESEITT
ITS own INTERESTS.
[Including Responses to Appellant, Point VI.]

I

I

Appellant's Brief urges that this issue is in3epara:_-,l
from a decision on Point II of its appeal and that a reversal \
I

of the trial court ruling on the buy, sell and exchange proper;.
issue would necessitate a reversal on thi3 issue as well.
Respondents deny any such connection.
The trial court's ruling cites original Section
10-6-119 and then provides that the Council has "power to
appropriate money for retention of counsel to represent their
interests."

T. R. at 445.

Appellant has chosen to appeal only

that portion of this ruling as it relates to retention of
counsel in regard to the real estate question.

This same

iss~-

retention of counsel, was addressed collaterally in the sixt~
claim for relief and to understand the factual context of the
trial court's ruling the judgment on both claims must be
combined.

The sixth claim for relief dealt with the power of

the Council to do certain acts by resolution, one of the
particular resolutions at issue being the retention of counsel
to investigate and pursue a certain real estate tran3action.
Sponsored
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-55it was stipulated that the appointed City
Attorn~y is disqualified to represent the
City in any action related to the Clair
Bernston prooerty trade . . .
T~2

court holds as to this Sixth Claim for
Relief that the Council does have the authority
und2r the circumstances, to retain counsel
for the purposes designated

T.R. at 445 (emphasis added.)
The factual context surrounding this issue was that
the City Attorney was disqualified by reason of familial
connections from pursuing the matter and the Mayor was admittedly
one of the city officials directly implicated in the questioned
real estate transaction.

Under the circumstances the Municipal

Council felt it had the power to independently appoint outside
legal counsel.

The Mayor and City Attorney vehemently denied

this power maintaining such an exercise was illegal.

82.

T.R. at

The issue presented to the trial court was whether the

Council could exercise this power "under the circumstances."
The trial court, limiting its ruling to the circumstances, held
the Council had such power.
Respondents urge the Court that pursuant to Section
10-3-1215 the Council is authorized and given power to effectuate
its duties.

Given what its duties are in respect to investi-

gating municipal administration, Section 10-3-1217, and its
duty collectively as a trustee of city property, Respondents
were authorized under the circumstances to retain outside
counsel.

Those specific circumstances being disqualification

of the acting City Attorney and a conflict of interest in the
Ma.Jor.
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-56V(A).

The Municipal Council may retain special counsel.
It is everywhere agreed, absent specific prohibition

to the contrary, that
the legislative or governing body of a
municipality--such as the city council
may employ counsel.

56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations
omitted).

§

221 at p. 281 (footnotes

Indeed,even where there is a specific prohibition

the governing body has been allowed to retain special counsel.
In Judson v. Niagara Falls it was held that the governing

bo~

could employ special counsel, despite charter prohibitions,
when the mayor was head of one of the departments being

invest~

gated and had the power of appointment and removal of the
regular city attorney.

97NE 1107 (N.Y.)

The occasion upon which special counsel may be
retained is not limited.
[A] municipal corporation having a regular
salaried city attorney is not for that
reason prevented from employing special
counsel in particular situations when the
city attorney is absent, ill or disqualified;
nor is such implied power of the municipal
corporation taken away where subsequent
enactments create the office of city attorney,
impose upon him the duty to prosecute or
defend all actions to which the municipal
corporation is a party, and provide that for
duties devolving upon any municipal officer
compensation shall not be paid to any other
person .
. A municipal! ty may employ special
counsel where a vacancy exists in the office
of the city or municipal attorney, or where
he refuses to act, or where there is a conflict
between departments or between officers of the
municipal corporation.

56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations
added.)

§

220 at p.

280.

( emphasi'

For example, in the case of Wiley v. Seattle, the
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Court held that when a question respecting the

various powers of respective groups within the municipality
arose and the municipal council and city attorney were arrayed
against the mayor, the mayor could employ special counsel on
behalf of the city.

35 P. 415 (Wash. 1893).

Interestingly

enough, it appears that courts have questioned more closely·
the mayor's right to employ special counsel.
St. Louis v. Thomas, 102 Ill. 453.

V(B).

See,

~'

East

(Ill.).

Appellant and City Attorney Zollinger were disqualified
and antagonistic to the Municipal Council
Appellant Mayor was a member of the previous Logan

City Commission which negotiated and authorized the exchange
with Clair Bernston.

Acting as Mayor, Appellant, actually

effected the transfers to Mr. Bernston.

Further, Appellant was

an active participant in approving the transaction.

T.R. 228

et.~-

Appellant Mayor and City Attorney Zollinger were (and
remain) in direct conflict with the majority of the Municipal
Council concerning the gravamen of this Action.

The Appellant

stoutly defended his views regarding the power of his office and
the City Attorney has supported that interpretation.

Further-

more, they have actively carried out their duties in contravention of the rules of law which this Complaint seeks to
establish.
The City Attorney Zollinger by his own admitted
conflict of interest and public statements is disqualified.
Transcript at 74.

Under these circwnstc:.nces it is entirely

by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization
by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
proper Sponsored
for the
Municipal
Council
toprovided
retain
special
counsel.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-)0~-Meeske v.

Bauman,

241 ll. 1i"v'.

550

(lJeb.),

131; Ireton v. State, 91 iJ.E. 1131.

(Ohio).

,~)J

cl.•

_!_J •

• \ •

PGI:iT VI
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ~!W ACT 3Y ORDI'.J.LUCS 02 RESOLUTIO:J' o;iu
ORDINA!JCES BEHJG SUBJECT TO ;,IAYORAL VETO.
[Including Responses to

Bur~?nshaw/Baird

?oin~o

III, IV, V.]

Appellant does not contest the trial court's
with respect to this issue.

rulin~

However, laced throughout the

Burtenshaw/Baird Brief are challenges to this ruling.

Under

the circumstances Respondent feels the issue should be laid
before this Court.
VI(A).

The Municioal Council may act by resolution or

ordina~'

The original Section 10-6-116 in discussing the voti~
procedure of a municipal Council under the Optional Forms o!
Municipal Government Act stated that every
motion, resolution or ordinance shall be
written and read before the vote is taken
on it.
(Emphasis added.)
10-3-717.

This section is now recodified at Section

The obvious implication of such statutory language

is that the Council could act by ordinance or resolution,
depending on ·,vhetiie.c· it is

e.1>.e~·-.:.i...;ir,g

legislative or administr'·

tive powers, respectively.
VI(B).

Only ordinances or aporopriation ordinances under tb_:
Optional Forms of Municioal Government Act are subj~
to veto.
Section lJ-3-1214

·Jvides that the Mayor may veto

"ordinances" or "appropriation ordinances."

The ;.1ayor i::;
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-59nowhere ~iven veto power over resolutions or motions of the
Municipal rouncil.

Incidentally it should be noted that

Section 10-3-1214 giving this veto power over "ordinances"
originally followed on the heel of original Section 10-6-116
which providccd that the Municipal Council may act by "resolution
or ordinance."

These Utah statutes follow the general rule that

the Mayor's veto is limited to ordinances adopted by the
Municipal Council or matters having the character of an
ordinance.
The treatises indicate that
the weight of authority limits the mayoral veto
in the absence of clear provision to purely
legislative matters.
The veto is ordinarily
not applicable to the internal functions of
the local legislative body, nor to administerial
or administrative matters.
2A Antieau,

§

4.37 at p. 4-71.

Where the mayor is given power of approval or
veto in general terms, it does not extend to
matters which are not legislative in
character .
In the absence of a charter
or statutory requirement, the resolution of
the municipal council need not be signed or
attested.
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations

VI(C).

§

359.

Resolutions are only appropriate for certain matters
Utah law sets up certain mandatory procedures for the

enactment of municipal ordinances.
et.

~·

See Sections 10-3-701

These procedures are applicable to a city following

the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act.
10-3-1204.
ordinances.

See Section

Section 10-3-711 requires the publication of
Resolutions, on the other hand, do not require

publicatjon.
Section
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law10-3-719.
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Municipalities in Utah and elsewhere have developed
customs about what is an appropriate matter for resolution and
what is more properly handled by ordinance.

In one shape or

another three distinctions are generally made:

first, ordii:a;,,,,

are acts of legislation where a resolution is not; second,
resolutions are used for matters temporary in nature, ordinanc:'
represent a permanent rule; and third, resolutions are generali,
used for matters administrative in nature.
10-3-701 et.

~-,

Indeed Section:;

now establish these rules as law.

An ordinance is distinguished from a resolution
by the degree of formality required by its
enactment.
An ordinance provides permanent
rules of government for conduct desired to
affect matters arising subsequent to its
adoption.
A resolution deals with matters of
a temporary or special nature, where the
action taken generally involves findings
of fact and may be characterized as administrative.
2A Antieau

§

4-14 at p.

4-30.

Thus, resolutions are generally

held appropriate Rhen they concern some matter of
and decide a particular matter.

See,

~'

administrati~

Kalamazoo Municipa'.

Utilities v. Kalamazoo, 76 NW 2d 1 (Mich.); Salisbury v.
Nagel, 420 SW 2d 37 (Mo. App.), Baker v.

Lake City Sewer

Dist. 191 P 2d 844 (Wash. 1948).

VI(D).

The three resolutions passed by the Municipal Council
regarding special counsel and litigation are

effecti~·

The first resolution which authorized retention of
special counsel to investigate the gravel pit exchange dealt
appropriately with an administrative matter.

The action taken

was as to one specific matter, had no general impact and was
of a permanent nature.

The second resolution retaining tllat
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special counsel and authorizing litigation, if necessary, wa 3

-61of like import.

T.R. at 83.

The thir1 resolution seeking to retain special counsel
incident to this litigation was also specific, temporary and
administrative.

T.R. at 84.

Quite obviously, these actions are

not the type which should receive a section number and be
placed in a book as ordinances of a city.

They are enacted

pursuant to the Municipal Council's control over the real
property and finances of a ·city and its power to have its legal
status determined.

Within these resolutions, there is no

determination affecting future conduct.

POINT VII
INDIVIDUAL COUNCILMEMBERS HAVE A FREE AND UNLIMITED RIGHT TO
MUNICIPAL RECORDS.
[Including Response to Appellant, Point V.]
Appellant does not clearly indicate in their Point V
whether they are appealing from the lower courts' ruling or in
what way said ruling is urged by them to be erroneous.

The

lower court's complete ruling with respect to this issue was as
follows:
As to the Eighth cause of action, the testimony
at the Evidentiary Hearing was conflicting as
far as the evidence was concerned as to what
the administration was supplying or not supplying to the Council as far as information is
concerned regarding city government.
The Mayor,
as defendant, claiming information has always
been available but also admitting that he did
apply a condition before providing the information himself to the Council, that condition
being a meeting between all department heads
and the requesting Council chairman.
As far as supplying information generally is
concerned, the Court holds that the Council
is entitled to any information that are records
pertaining to the city and in custody of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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executive branch and that they may, by
resolution or ordinance, set the policy by
which they may obtain this information in
a reasonable manner and provide and allocate
funds for its assembly in the form that they
feel will be most efficient and effective
for t~eir use. a~i to ~iva direction to the
executive branch as to their policy on
obtaining the information by resolution or
ordi~ance as lon~ as it does not make unreasonable demands especially involving the
element of time for the accumulation of
the information.
446-~47.

Final Summary Declaratory Judgment, T.R. at
verbatim from the trial court's Memorandum

~ecision,

[ ta%e:.
a~

T.R.

405 J.
Evidently Appellant wishes to have the Supreme Cour:
find the Mayor did not deny Chairman Larsen information buc
merely declined to himself assemble records.

The trial court

gave no evidenciar:/ findings as to whether there was or was no1
such a denial.

The trial court terminated the evidentiary

process having found a justiciable issue and then proceeded
to set forth what it found to be the law as to the information
requests between the Council and Mayor.

Transcript at 75-76.

Evidently Appellant does not wish to contest the legal

find~g

by the trial court on this issue, making reference to the same
as a "rather petty matter."

Appellant's Brief at 32.

In

answer thereto Respondents can only note the futility of

arg~~

over Appellant's mischaracteri zation of the facts if Appellanc
is unwilling to appeal the legal finding.

It is unusual to

find a Brief challenging the trial court's fact finding which
then acquiesces to the legal rule derived therefrom.
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Appellant mistates the facts
Respondent does challenge the facts as represented

in Appellant's Brief.

Respondent maintains that the Mayor

did refuse acc2J2, granted access which was only conditional,
and, finally, inaugurated a city policy intended to effectively
control and limit information obtainable by Council Members.
Appellant's own Brief filed in the District Court accurately
states the position taken by Appellant with respect to information requested by Council Members:
As Plaintiff Darwin Larsen has repeatedly
demonstrated, to whatever he turns his
attention develops into a "controversy"
which often is not really a controversy.
This is the case with respect to his request
for information.
If there is an issue perhaps the right of the City Administration to
be free from undue interference from Munici~al
Council Members as reflected in Section 10- -121
U.C.A. 1953, is the real question. Must City
Administration immediately furnish all materials
requested by a Municipal Council member regardless of the amount of information requested,
the amount of time given to obtain the information, the relevancy of the material to legitimate
Council business and the amount of time and
money involved in seeking out, gathering, and
copying the material? Access to public records
(which no one disputes) is much different than
repeated demands for substantial amounts of
detailed material the purpose of which often
appears to have no relation to council business
and which not only disrupts City employee workloads, but has a demoralizing effect on all
aspects of City administration.
To set guidelines in an effort to minimize such adverse
influences seems to be reasonable.
T.R. 131-32 (emphasis added).

Admittedly, with sophisticated

counsel the issues raised have been predictably shifted and
reshaped, Appellant would have the Court believe the issue was
whether the Mayor must himself supply information.

That was

not the issue before the trial court, and Respondents have
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-64never urged that the Mayor himself was required to deliVtoi'
information.
With respect to why Chairman Larsen directed his
request to Mayor Anderson for certain documents it shoulcl be
noted that there is a Logan ordinance requiring the sam

0

•

Section 2-1-4, Logan Ordinances (1976), states that staff
assistance to the Municipal Council is "to be furnished by tr.c
Executive Branch through the chief executive officer."

1'hat

is, if Chairman Larsen wanted copies of certain documents ra:''i
than request it of the City Recorder, he would be required t8
direct such a request to the Mayor.

!

In conjunction therewith

the Mayor adopted a policy that no staff assistance or copies
could be rendered to Council members except through his office.
Transcript at 36.

That quite adequately explains why the

request was put to the Mayor rather than the custodian of the
records.

Furthermore, the suggestion that Chairman Larsen

w~

in some fashion demeaning the Mayor by demanding he personally
go copy the records, assemble and staple them is pure fiction
and totally unsupported by any evidence in the record.
It should also be noted that these voluminous
requests which "demoralized" the entire city administration anc
"disrupted" employee workloads were introduced as exhibits in
the evidentiary hearing.

See Plaintiff's Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and

6.
The only demoralizing or disruptive effect these
requests producedwas that resulting from the disclosure of
information as to the manner in which the Appellant was mi::conducting city business.

That is, the requests did not
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dehloralize or disrupt, but the public dissemination of the
information may well have done so, for it revealed widespread
violations of state and municipal law by the city administration.
For example, unknown property transactions, interfund transfers,
etc.
Mr. Larsen's testimony with respect to his requests
was that
Mr. Zollinger [city attorney) said that I
could have the information, if I was not
going to make trouble with it.
But he said
that if I was going to make trouble with
the information that I received that I would
have to pay the cost of having the material
assembled and the cost of reproducing.

i

I
I

nci

Transcript at

63 (emphasis added).

The Court should note that

Mr. Larsen was no mere citizen, but the elected Chairman of the
Municipal Council requesting information with regard to city
matters.
The Logan City administration had imposed certain
restrictions on information.

The City Recorder's testimony

at the evidentiary hearing was as follows:
Q

Now has the Mayor on any occasion ever
announced to you and other department heads
any policy concerning circumstances or
conditions upon which information in your
office will be furnished to anyone?

A

Yes.

Q

When was the policy announced, as best you
recall?

A

I don't remember the dates.
It was in one
of our weekly department meetings.

Q

And do you remember about when it would have
been? Would it have been around the first
of this year, 1977?

A

I couldn't give you a date on it.
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Well, would you just tell us what t:1:1t
policy was that was announced, as best
you recall ii;?

A

he just asked that information be clear~d
through his office as a mana~ement tool,
you l:no':1.

Q

And after that pe~·~a o~ time ~~en a re1uest
came to you for information that was in
your possession what did you do with those
requests?

A

I accumulated ~hatever they requested and
then gave it to the Mayor to clear through
his office.

Transcript at 53.

The testimony is buttressed by that of Mr.

Larsen and Appellant's own testimony.

See Transcript at 27-

54-56, 59, 65, 71-72.
The

e~identiary

hearing also showed quite clearly

the placing of additional conditions on Mr. Larsen's access to
information, to wit:

that it would be provided him only on

condition thai:; he attend certain staff meetings.

In fact,

Appellant indicates that it was collected by city

emplo~,2~s

but that he refused to deliver it until Chairman Larsen
complied with his conditions.

See Transcript at 29-37, 42, 60-i

Appellant's characterization of this issue on appeal
as being a "petty matter" together with its characterization
in open court as a "tempest in a teapot" well indicates
Appellant's attitude.

Transcript at 72.

Respondent urges this

Court that the Trial Record and particularly the Transcript
of the September 13th, 1977, Evidentiary Hearing, evidence a
disturbing attempt to reduce and limit access to public
information concerning city administration. This attempt is
characterized by nebulous "policies," vague "conditions,"
and administrative questioning of what is proper informat i,~>1 1
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-67for the Council members and what they intend to do with it.
These requests for information and the administrative reaction
to them did not occur in a vacuum but at a time when the Council
pursuant to its duty, was legitimately questioning
conduct by the Mayor and his subordinates.

widespread

The trial court

later found, pursuant to the instant case, the conduct of
Appellant was contrary to Utah municipal law.
The trial court found evidence on this information
issue conflicting, but because of the compelling and basic legal
requirements regarding free and unlimited access to information
was compelled to set out in detail the legal requirements.

It

might also be noted that Respondents did not present all their
evidence on this issue as it was stipulated that sufficient
evidence had been rendered to make the issue justiciable, thus
finding the issue justiciable, the trial court gave its legal
rule which Appellant does not dispute to this Court.
at

75-76.

Transcript

Rather, Appellant now disputes the partial facts

introduced.

The legal ruling should now be reaffirmed.

POINT VIII
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT HEADS MAY TRANSFER ONLY UNENCUMBERED OR
UNEXPENDED APPROPRIATIONS WITHIN A DEPARTMENT WITHOUT COUNCIL
APPROVAL, UNENCUMBERED FUNDS BEING THOSE FUNDS NOT SET ASIDE
FOR BUDGETED LINE ITEMS.
[Including Response to Appellant Point IV.]
Appellant's Point IV again mistates the issue before
this Court.

The trial court's Final Judgment clearly states

that intra-departmental budgeting transfers may be made without
the Council's consent or involvement.

T.R. at

444.

Neither

Appellant nor Respondents have appealed that ruling. However,
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-68the issue before this Court on Respondent's ninth claim for
relief deals with whai;

ad:r,inistra;:~

;e r2.3p2ct must be? accorded

line items in Logan's budbetary process.
city's

ad~~nistrative

That is, are the

departments free to reallocate monies

from appropriated monies for a specified line item to an
new item not stated in the budget.

enti~

For example, can administr:.

tive officers who have received budgetary approval for four au:.,
mobiles for the Street Department unilaterally cancel that
appropriation and purchase a patrol on a conditional sales
contract?

That is the issue before this court.

T.R. at 10.

Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing where evidence
was taken regarding Logan City practices, the issue was
submitted to court by legal memorandums.

Plaintiffs Memorandum,

T.R. at 364-372, Defendant's Memorandum, T.R. at 399-401.
The trial court thereupon rendered judgment on this
issue holding that the administrative officials could not

ent~

into conditional sales contracts without Municipal Council
approval as they were installment debts, binding future operation of the Municipality.

T.R. at 447.

The Court further heN

and reaffirmed that intradepartmental transfers of unencumbe~d
and unexpended funds did not need Council approval.

But in

explaining that ruling the Court held funds budgeted for a
specified line item were "encumbered."

T.R. at 447.

only from this last interpretation that

Appellant has appealed

It is

in Point IV of his Brief.
VIII(A).

The general operation of the Uniform Municipal Pi~
Procedures Act provides oublic and Council
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tud;ets

div~rsion

?~d

pres~PTTes

Council control over

of funds from snecified line items.

The Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act closely
details the law relating to fiscal procedures in Utah municipali ties.

It provides for tentativ2 budgets, public review and

publication before final passage.

There are requirements that

detailed estimates of expenditures be submitted to the governing
body.

Section 10-10-33(5)(6).

It requires the tentative budget

with these detailed estimates shall be made public. Section 10-10-34
The public is notified of a public hearing regarding the budget.
Section 10-10-36.

The plain import of these procedures is to

allow both the governing body and citizenry to speak concerning
the items in the budget, i.e. "we don't need two new police
cars" or "we need three cars," etc.

Section 10-10-37 provides

that in adopting the final budget the governing body may "insert
such new items or may increase or decrease such items of
expenditure."
After adoption of the budget, in relation to dealing
with expenditure accounts and line items, there are restrictions
upon the administrative officials:
To implement the use of the encumbrances system
he [the budget officer) shall cause separate
accounts to be kept for the items of appropriation contained in the budget of each fund,
each of which shall show the amount of the
appropriation, the amounts paid therefrom,
the unpaid obligations against it and the
unencumbered balance.
No appropriation shall
be encumbered and no expenditure shall be made
for any item of appropriation unless there is
a sufficient unencumbered balance of appropriation and available funds for said item,
except in cases of emergency as hereinafter
provided.
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-7010-10-43 (empha::;L added).
With the consent of the budget officer, the he~J
of any department may trans l'e1' any unencu:niJereu
or unexpended appropriation balance or any
portion thereof from one expenditure account to
another within the department during the bud;e~
year, or an excess expe:1d.i ':-ure u..:_'

()_~~

·=:-r.,

r:1s~ .~

line items may be permitted by any department
head with the consent of the budget officer,
provided the total of all excess expenditures
or encumbrances de no~ exceed tctal unused
appropriations within the department at the
close of the budget year.
10-10-46 (Emphasis added).

These restrictions allow so8e

flexibility; a department head with the consent of the bud;,;
of:icer may shift surplus funds from one expenditure account
to another.

In addition, the department head, again with

budget officer approval, may cause excess expenditure for a
given line item.

But nowhere are the department heads and

budget officer given authority to appropriate funds•

designa~e;

for a particular line item, to a different purpose.

That is,

there is a recognition that there are miscellaneous funds and
that some line items may be purchased with less than the set
appropriation and thereby result in surplus funds.

As to thcs'

funds the department head and budget officer have a needed
flexibility, they may shift them to a line item for which

t~

appropriation was low or they may shift them to another expenci·
ture account.

For example, the funds could be shifted to

police salaries so as to pay a cost overrun due to overtime
incurred by police officers, etc.
VIII(B).

The Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act applies
directly to Logan City
Section 10-3-1204 of the Optional Forms of Municipa'
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Government Act provides that

d

-71All existing statutes governing municipalities
snall remain applicable except as provided in
thi::; part.
~urther~ore

in

in Section 10-3-1219 (6) the Act further provides

delineatin~

the specific powers of the Mayor, that he shall

[a]ppoint a budget officer for the purpose of
conforming with the requirements of the uniform
m~~~:i ~l fiscal procedures act and in all other
respects fulfill the requirements of that act;
By these statutes,

the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act

i3 made fully applicable to Logan City except as the Optional
Forms of Municipal Government Act specifically provides otherwise.

Respondents further contend that the only significant

change made by the Act is set forth in Section 10-3-1214.
This statute provides participation by both the Municipal Council
and Hayor in passing "appropriation ordinances" in that it allows
the Mayor to veto an appropriation.
VIII(C).

Aopellant's theory would destroy the integrity of a
participatory budget process.
Appellant contends that once the final budget ordinance

is passed that Municipal Council control, except as to interfund
and interdepartmental transfers, is at an end.

Furthe~

that

the administrative officials of the city on their own authority
may trasnfer any and all funds between accounts and line items.
Respondents urge the Court that if this were the
case, the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act procedures
requiring notice, hearings, etc., are a mere facade, a public
show, behind which, administrative officials determine actual
expenditures.

For example, after weighty consideration and public

hearing the Council could decide the police department needs new
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- 72vehicles and create line items

~J~

their purchase.

Were the

Appellant's position adopted, the department head with the
consent of the budget offic2r could without any other authorit;
transfer funds from the employee allocation in his department
I

budget and purchase fifteen police cars.

If Appellant's positi.J

is correct the Municipal Council and citizenry should not
bother discussing how many police cars are needed, a dollar
sum should simply be allocated to each department.
no control.

There is

Appellant's contention is that the "departmental

grant" is the limit of the control which can lawfully be
exerted by the Council.

Quite

obviousl~

the requirements of

providing detailed estimates to the governing body, public
hearings concerning the items of expenditure and a budget

whi~

appropriates to these line i terns would be of no binding effect.
The whole procedure under that interpretation is a mere facade.
Respondents reject those arguments maintaining that
fiscal procedures embody a set of legal controls, to wit:

that

the only appropriations which may be adminis tra ti ve ly realloc2te:
are those which are earmarked miscellaneous or which are truly
surplus.

Further, that the Municipal Council, after proper

citizen input, by adopting a budget with detailed line items
legally binds administrative officials to use public funds for
those purposes and none other.

Of

cours~

changes may be

required and the Council is free to cause those changes in
accordance with the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act.
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Line items are a definable and significant part of
the

bud~etary

control process.

The budgets of Logan City in the past and presently
show little relation to the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures
Act.

However, certain appropriatiO(l.> can be called "line items"

for example:
Item #251

2 patrols

Item #252

3 pickup trucks
2 1

$90,000.00
15,000.00

1/2 ton trucks

- 3/4 ton truck

In the example above, it is clear that one line item is two
patrols and the other line item is the three pickup trucks and
that there is left considerable administrative discretion.
Logan City's budget has no such clear designations.

However, it

does appear in the Logan City budget what general equipment
type the appropriation was for and, under the present circumstances, it appears reasonable to consider a specific appropriation for a particular equipment item as a line item.

It should

be noted that the legislative body by its use of the designation
"Item" can control the amount of discretion left in administrative officials.

In the example given, supra, in "Item #252"

each vehicle could be made a line item or the three trucks
could be made one line item.

In the example's wording it

appears that administrative officials could order two 3/4 ton
pickups and one 1/2 ton pickup rather than as specified therein.
Nowhere, of course, is there authority or discretion given to
buy four pickups under Item #251 appropriating money for patrols.
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A Colorado case dealing with the purchase of vat
machines supports Respondents' reasoning:
It is undisputed that the budget items totaling
$132,843 and the subsequent aopropriation of
$132,800 was intended to provide payment for
the items of contemplated expense specifically
itemized in the commission's budget, none of
which pertained in any respect to purchase of
voting machines.
Under charter provisions, after
the budget is made, the several sums shall then
be appropriated by ordinance "to the several
purposes and departments therein named."
True, the charter provides that, "The budget
shall be prepared in such details as to the
aggregate sum and the items thereof allowed
to each department, office or commission as the
council shall deem advisable subject to limitations in this charter," and where, as in the case
before us, a single appropriation is made covering the total of numerous items separately, but
rather that the total expenditure for the amounts
so budgeted together must not exceed the total
of the appropriation therefor, and that the
money appropriated to that class can be used
for no other purpose except the items in the
budget for which the appropriation was made. In
the case before us, either the appropriations
must be held void as being without a specified
purpose, or they must be construed as being for
the purposes specified in the budget upon which
the appropriations are, and must be based.
The
payment of $7,050 as authorized by the city under
the ordinance and contract for purchase of the
Shoup machines could not by any contortion be
fitted into any o~ the purposes specified in
those budgeted items
Under the provisions of the Denver charter,
appropriation items must be tied to the budget;
payments of city funds must be restricted to
the purposes for which they were appropriated
and budgeted, and any contract for payment
during the year 1951 not so appropriated and
budgeted for that year and not caused by any
casu~l~y, accident or unfore~een conti~~ency
after ~he pa~-~~e of the 3~n~~: appropriation
ordinanc , a~ groviJe~ in Sectic~ 3J4 of the
charter, mLG t be heJd v0id.
Kingsley v. City and County of Denver, ?1

1

-

••

J.

C'~'J,

(Colo. 1952).
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-75Under Logan City's present budget practices it
appears appropriate to consider each item for which a money
v2lu~
exce~~

is tied to a specified purpose to be a line item and
for some abevations this appears workable.

One abera-

tion is that each worker's salary is specified, it appears
recsonable in the case of, for example, firemen salaries to
regard the salary total as the line item rather than the
specified amount for each particular individual.
The testimony of Logan Budget Officer, Duane Beck
indicated that, in general, the interpretation presented herein
corresponds with his opinion of what a line item is.
at 92-93.

However, Mr. Beck indicated line item treatment was

not considered binding on administrative officials.
at 95-96.

Transcript

Transcript

Further, that the city administration had in fact

purchased a very expensive patrol for the city on a conditional
sales contract and out of Class C road funds not appropriated
by the Municipal Court for such a purchase.
100-105.

Transcript at

Respondents urge that line item treatment for such

a purchase is required.
VIII(E).

General law requires specific appropriations by
le~islative

bodies.

In dealing with budgets and appropriations there are
numerous references to the need for specificity so as to allow
citizen review and discussion of the application of tax monies.
A taxpayer has the right to have the purpose
of an appropriation stated in sufficiently
clear and intelligble manner, so that he
can understand, from it, what it is for, and
so that he may have a basis for determining
prioritJ.
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Application of Cook County, 304 N.E. 2d 46, 48 (Ill. 1970).
The only logical interpretation of this
provision [restricting expenditures to
amounts appropriated, compare C.R.S. 1963,
88-1-14 vii th its Utali equivalents § § 10-10-39,
45] is that since there is an absolute
prohibition a0ainst spending in excess of an
appropriation, there can be no sum spent when
there is no appropriation. While application
of this statute to the facts in the instant
case may have harsh results, the statute is,
nevertheless, binding upon us.
Its purpose
is to protect the taxpayer against improvident
use of tax revenue, to encourage citizen
participation and debate prior to the
institution of public orojects, to insure
public disclosure of proposed spenaing, and
to encourage prudence and thrift by those
elected to direct expenditure of public funds.
Accordingly, it, in conjunction with certain
other provisions of the budget law, requires
that certain formalities, such as public
hearings and formal adoption of budgets, be
complied with before public funds can be spent.
Shannon Water Dist. v. Norris Drilling Co., 477 P2d, 478 (Colo.
1970) (emphasis added).
Isn't the purpose of the budget law to require
that all proposed expenditures be itemized and
published for the scrutiny of the public, to
the end that every constituent of the governing body may examine the items of anticipated
expenditures? We think that is a fairly good
analysis of its purpose, or one of them at
least.
Washington Twp. v. Hart, 215 P2d 180, 181 (Wash. 1950).
The position of Appellant is that by law the public
has no legal ground for input or control over the budget as
within departments, and further, that Logan's governing body,
the Municipal Council, also has no power over the budget once
it is initially appropriated.
Respondents maintain that except for such authority,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum
and Library administrative
Services
restrictively
construed,
as provided
is expressly
given
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-77officials by the Fiscal ?rocedures Act there is no administrative authority to juggle line items or appropriations.
An appropriation of public funds is a setting
apart from public revenue of a certain sum of
money for a specified purpose in such a manner
that the executive officers of the government
are authorized to use that money a~d no more
for the purpose specified and no other.
State v. Moore, 69 N.W.

373

In specific terms, an appropriation may be
defined as an authority of the legislative,
given at the proper time and in legal form
to the proper officers to apply a distinctly
specified sum from a designated fund out of
the treasury in a given year, for a specified
object or demand against the state.
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Funds

§

46 (footnotes omitted).

The power of the legislature with respect to
the public funds raised by general taxation
is supreme, and no state official, from the
highest to the lowest, has any power to
create an obligation of the state, either
legal or moral, unless there has first been
a specific appropriation of funds to meet
the obligation.
42 Am Jur, Public Funds

42 (footnotes omitted).

The object of such provisions is to prohibit
expenditures of public funds at the mere
will and caprice of those having the funds
in custody, without direct legislative
sanction therefor.
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Funds

§

45 (footnotes omitted).

Respondents urge that they, as the Municipal Council,
possess plenary budget control over the administrative
officials of Logan City.

And further, that under applicable

state law their designation of appropriations for certain line
items is binding on administrative officials.

Respondents urge

that the purchase of large scale equipment customarily accorded
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney such
Law Library.as
Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute ofauthorization
Museum and Library Services
line item
treatment
patrols,
without
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-78therefore is contrary to the Uniform Municipal Fiscal
Procedures Act.

The citizens of Logan City and their elected

officials have been deprived by the present budgetary

operatic~

of their legal right to notice and participation in the alloc 2 tion of

c~eir

Respondents'

tax monies.

An old Massachusetts case sums up

positio~:

As has been held repeatedly the design of
the budget law for cities was to set rigid
barriers against expenditures in excess of
appropriation, to cultivate municipal thrift,
to prevent the borrowing of money for current
expenses and in general to put cities upon
a sound financial basis so far as those ends
can be achieved by legislation.
(Citing
cases).
It would strongly tend to frustrate
this design if the juggling with appropriations
already made, such as thus disclosed, were
upheld.
Burt v. Municipal Council, 176 N.E. 511, 513 (Mass.).

CONCLUSION

i

Respondents urge th2t the trial court's opinion shouii'
be reaffirmed in its

e~~irety

by this Court.

The powers

oft~

Municipal Council vis-a-vis the Mayor are determined under
state law.

The only reasonable interpretation of the laws

governing Logan City is that the Council possesses the municipa:

I

governing powers except as those powers are specifically
enumerated and given the Mayor by the Optional Forms of Munic~~
Government Act.
Respondents initially sought a court determination
of their powers and duties so that they could properly
represent, in their elected positions, the citizens of Logan
City.

.I

Respondents now ask the Supreme Court to delineate tJ1occ
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-79respo11sibilities for the benefit of the citizens of Logan city
and to thereby assist present and future elected officials to
adequately perform their duties and responsibilities.

Respectfully submitted
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